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<Article>
<Journal>
				<PublisherName>دانشگاه تهران</PublisherName>
				<JournalTitle>فصلنامه سیاست</JournalTitle>
				<Issn>1735-9678</Issn>
				<Volume>56</Volume>
				<Issue>2</Issue>
				<PubDate PubStatus="epublish">
					<Year>2026</Year>
					<Month>06</Month>
					<Day>22</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</Journal>
<ArticleTitle>A Methodological Feasibility Study of the Application of Reason as a Source in Political Jurisprudence: A Critical Reconsideration</ArticleTitle>
<VernacularTitle>امکان‌سنجی روش‌شناختی کاربست عقل منبعی در فقه سیاسی: بازاندیشی نقادانه</VernacularTitle>
			<FirstPage>401</FirstPage>
			<LastPage>377</LastPage>
			<ELocationID EIdType="pii">107408</ELocationID>
			
<ELocationID EIdType="doi">10.22059/jpq.2026.401447.1008422</ELocationID>
			
			<Language>FA</Language>
<AuthorList>
<Author>
					<FirstName>هادی</FirstName>
					<LastName>جلالی اصل</LastName>
<Affiliation>استادیار گروه فقه سیاسی، دانشکده الهیات و ادیان، دانشگاه شهید بهشتی، تهران، ایران.</Affiliation>
<Identifier Source="ORCID">0000-0002-3213-6637</Identifier>

</Author>
</AuthorList>
				<PublicationType>Journal Article</PublicationType>
			<History>
				<PubDate PubStatus="received">
					<Year>2025</Year>
					<Month>09</Month>
					<Day>07</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</History>
		    <Abstract>IntroductionPolitical jurisprudence, as a foundational branch of Islamic jurisprudence, constantly grapples with the sources and methodologies used to derive legal rulings. Among these, the status of reason as a source—that is, reason functioning as an independent authority alongside scripture and tradition—remains one of the most contentious issues in Twelver Shi&#039;i thought. This debate is particularly significant in the political sphere, where complexities such as conflicting interests, fluid circumstances, and the risk of secularizing religious discourse are most pronounced. The central question of this article is whether reason can reliably and methodologically serve as an independent source for political rulings, and if so, what limitations govern its application. MethodologyThis study employs a descriptive–analytical approach within the framework of political jurisprudence philosophy. It first explores the place of reason in Imami thought through two main pathways: (1) deriving rulings by identifying compelling benefits and harms (masāliḥ and mafāsid), and (2) rational approbation and disapprobation (ḥusn and qubḥ). The study then analyzes the theoretical and methodological challenges associated with these approaches in the political context. Sources include classical Imami jurisprudential works, major uṣūl texts, exegetical literature, and contemporary scholarship in the philosophy of political jurisprudence.Results and DiscussionThe findings reveal that the central difficulty with source reason lies not in its general legitimacy (ḥujjiyya kubrā), but rather in the possibility of definitively arriving at specific rulings (ḥukm sharʿī ṣughrā).The first pathway—deriving rulings through benefits and harms—is hindered by the difficulty of distinguishing between the benefit inherent in the divine ruling itself and the benefit inherent in its object. In the political realm, given the multiplicity of variables, the tension between short- and long-term interests, and the instability of conditions, definitively identifying benefits becomes nearly impossible.The second pathway—rational approbation and disapprobation—can be examined in two forms: first, based on the consensus of the rational community, and second, based on rational judgments about interests and harms. In the first case, consensus is only possible regarding a limited set of self-evident values, many of which have been historically disputed. Moreover, rational conventions often reflect dominant discourses and social perceptions, rendering them unreliable as definitive criteria. The second form ultimately reduces to the problem of benefit–harm reasoning, with its own set of uncertainties.Therefore, this study argues that any uncritical reliance on claims of rational judgment—whether rooted in cultural traditions, religious heritage, or modern Western standards—is methodologically unsound in political jurisprudence. ConclusionThis study concludes that in political jurisprudence, reason as an independent source can only be employed within a critical and methodological framework, one that shields it from the hidden influences of social and political discourses. While the application of source reason faces serious methodological limitations in deriving binding rulings, the instrumental role of reason in subject analysis (mawḍūʿ-shināsī) and case application (miṣdāq-shināsī) remains indispensable to the jurisprudential process. This study calls for a methodological rethinking of rational inference in political jurisprudence—one that balances reason and revelation—in order to prevent the secularization of rulings and the subjective interpretation of scriptural texts.</Abstract>
			<OtherAbstract Language="FA">این پژوهش با هدف امکان‌سنجی روش‌شناختی کاربست عقل به‌عنوان منبعی مستقل در استنباط احکام شرعی در فقه سیاسی انجام شده است. عقل در فقه امامیه، افزون بر کارکرد ابزاری در فهم متون دینی، می‌تواند از طریق کشف مصالح و مفاسد ملزمه و نیز تحسین و تقبیح عقلی، به‌صورت منبعی مستقل در فرایند استنباط ایفای نقش کند. این مطالعه با روش توصیفی–تحلیلی و در چارچوب فلسفه مضاف به فقه سیاسی، به بررسی چالش‌های کاربرد عقل منبعی در حوزة احکام سیاسی می‌پردازد. یافته‌ها نشان می‌دهد که چالش بنیادین نه در اصل حجیت عقل، بلکه در تحقق عملی «کشف قطعی» حکم شرعی است؛ مسئله‌ای که به‌واسطۀ کثرت متغیرها، تزاحم مصالح، فسادخیز بودن قدرت و تأثیرپذیری ادراکات عقلانی از دانش عامه پیچیده‌تر می‌شود. مقاله با تحلیل دو مسیر عمدۀ کشف حکم (مصالح/مفاسد و حسن/قبح) نشان می‌دهد که دستیابی به قطع روشمند در بیشتر موارد دشوار است. افزون بر این، بنای عقلا نیز اغلب برخاسته از عرف‌های متأثر از گفتمان‌های مسلط است و نمی‌توان آن را معیار قطعی در فقه سیاسی دانست. بر این اساس، پژوهش بر ضرورت نگاه نقادانه به آنچه اقتضای حکم عقل تلقی می‌شود تأکید دارد تا از عرفی‌ شدن احکام به بهانة عقل‌گرایی جلوگیری شود.</OtherAbstract>
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			<Param Name="value">عقل منبعی</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">فقه سیاسی</Param>
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			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">مصالح و مفاسد ملزمه</Param>
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			<Param Name="value">حسن و قبح عقلی</Param>
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			<Param Name="value">دانش عامه</Param>
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			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">روش‌شناسی استنباط</Param>
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<ArchiveCopySource DocType="pdf">https://jpq.ut.ac.ir/article_107408_2bf2e282fd8e6df7394c5a836355f4ca.pdf</ArchiveCopySource>
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