University of Tehran POLITICAL QUARTERLY 1735-9678 55 1 2025 04 05 The Relationship Between Economic-Social Factors and Political Knowledge The Relationship Between Economic-Social Factors and Political Knowledge 21 1 101100 10.22059/jpq.2025.276137.1007389 FA Kioomars Ashtarian Associate Professor, Faculty of Law and Political Science, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran. 0000-0003-2739-1104 Ali Akbar Asadi Kesheh PhD in Political Science, Faculty of Law and Political Science, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran. Journal Article 2019 02 15 Introduction Political knowledge influences strikes, political elections, political tolerance, political beliefs, and the overall political behavior of individuals (Carpini and Keiter, 1993), but perhaps, as Miller (2001) points out, the most important effect of (political) knowledge is to increase the civic competence of the public for political participation in a democratic government and to prevent extremism, alienation, and the dominance of technocratic attitudes among the elite (Miller, 2001). On the other hand, according to Carpini and Keiter (1997), politically informed citizens are more interested in and participate in political activities. In fact, political knowledge shapes citizens' attitudes towards political activities by defining interests and creating unity in beliefs based on interests (Bramlett, 2013). However, citizens' political knowledge is not equal to each other, and the unequal distribution of political knowledge among citizens is an established fact in the field of political science (Simon, 2017). Most researchers focused on the inequality of political knowledge distribution among individuals on the variables of education, gender, age, and income. Most studies conducted to examine these variables are focused on American and European societies, but Iranian society requires further study due to its different situation, especially the young population, their increasing presence, especially women, in universities and higher education centers, and the growth of the middle class. Accordingly, the research question focuses on the level of general political knowledge, and then we analyze the direction and intensity of the relationship between the contextual variables (gender, education, age, and income) and general political knowledge in Iranian society. The Research MethodThe research data were collected through a survey and questionnaire from citizens aged 18 and above in 22 districts of Tehran using a multi-stage-stratified cluster sampling method in January 2017. Multiple linear regression analysis (multivariate) was used to analyze the data; in such a way that the regression output shows an estimate of the amount of change in general political knowledge (as a dependent variable) with a one-unit change in each of the independent variables including gender, age, education, and income, while all other independent variables are held constant. In such a case, the partial correlation size of each of the independent variables is measured by multivariate linear regression. Results According to the research findings, the political knowledge variable as the dependent variable, the mean and standard deviation of political knowledge are equal to six out of 14 and 3.4 respectively, and on average, respondents answered 43 percent of the questions correctly. Also, 73.2 percent of respondents chose the correct answer to the following question "In 1979, Iran converted to the "Islamic Republic" system through a referendum," while only 18.8 percent of people answered the following question "what was Iran's unemployment rate in 2016?"Based on the output of the SPSS software, the regression coefficient of determination is (R^2=0.322), meaning that 32.2 percent of the variability of the general political knowledge variable can be explained by independent variables including age, education, income, and gender. All independent variables have a significant positive relationship with the general political knowledge variable, the intensity of the relationship of the variables with general political knowledge varies, such that education (0.436), age (0.261), gender (0.208) and income (0.095) have the highest relationship with general political knowledge, respectively. Regarding the gender variable, it should be noted that the gender categories are coded with the numbers zero (female) and one (male), and according to the beta value (0.208), men scored 20.8 percent higher than women in general political knowledge. Conclusion The level of general political knowledge of men is higher than that of women, and the number of options selected by women as "I don't know" is higher than that of men. As a result, it can be said that contrasting structural positions and contrasting responsibilities, resources, constraints and structural pressures resulting from socio-cultural conditions and women's reluctance to guess in answering questions affect the level of political knowledge of both sexes. Also, the education variable has the strongest relationship with the level of political knowledge; This relationship could be due to the motivation, opportunities, and abilities that education provides to the educated, as argued by Carpini and Keeter (1996), which increase their level of political knowledge. Also, the age variable is related to the level of political knowledge of individuals; this relationship could be due to the accumulation of objective experience and information that an individual acquires with increasing age, but with increasing age (age range 58 and above), the level of political knowledge decreases due to the weakening of cognitive ability, as pointed out by Lau and Redlawsk (2008). Finally, although income had a significant relationship with political knowledge, this relationship was less than 0.1; this situation could be due to the greater number of people with higher education in low-income groups. Introduction Political knowledge influences strikes, political elections, political tolerance, political beliefs, and the overall political behavior of individuals (Carpini and Keiter, 1993), but perhaps, as Miller (2001) points out, the most important effect of (political) knowledge is to increase the civic competence of the public for political participation in a democratic government and to prevent extremism, alienation, and the dominance of technocratic attitudes among the elite (Miller, 2001). On the other hand, according to Carpini and Keiter (1997), politically informed citizens are more interested in and participate in political activities. In fact, political knowledge shapes citizens' attitudes towards political activities by defining interests and creating unity in beliefs based on interests (Bramlett, 2013). However, citizens' political knowledge is not equal to each other, and the unequal distribution of political knowledge among citizens is an established fact in the field of political science (Simon, 2017). Most researchers focused on the inequality of political knowledge distribution among individuals on the variables of education, gender, age, and income. Most studies conducted to examine these variables are focused on American and European societies, but Iranian society requires further study due to its different situation, especially the young population, their increasing presence, especially women, in universities and higher education centers, and the growth of the middle class. Accordingly, the research question focuses on the level of general political knowledge, and then we analyze the direction and intensity of the relationship between the contextual variables (gender, education, age, and income) and general political knowledge in Iranian society. The Research MethodThe research data were collected through a survey and questionnaire from citizens aged 18 and above in 22 districts of Tehran using a multi-stage-stratified cluster sampling method in January 2017. Multiple linear regression analysis (multivariate) was used to analyze the data; in such a way that the regression output shows an estimate of the amount of change in general political knowledge (as a dependent variable) with a one-unit change in each of the independent variables including gender, age, education, and income, while all other independent variables are held constant. In such a case, the partial correlation size of each of the independent variables is measured by multivariate linear regression. Results According to the research findings, the political knowledge variable as the dependent variable, the mean and standard deviation of political knowledge are equal to six out of 14 and 3.4 respectively, and on average, respondents answered 43 percent of the questions correctly. Also, 73.2 percent of respondents chose the correct answer to the following question "In 1979, Iran converted to the "Islamic Republic" system through a referendum," while only 18.8 percent of people answered the following question "what was Iran's unemployment rate in 2016?"Based on the output of the SPSS software, the regression coefficient of determination is (R^2=0.322), meaning that 32.2 percent of the variability of the general political knowledge variable can be explained by independent variables including age, education, income, and gender. All independent variables have a significant positive relationship with the general political knowledge variable, the intensity of the relationship of the variables with general political knowledge varies, such that education (0.436), age (0.261), gender (0.208) and income (0.095) have the highest relationship with general political knowledge, respectively. Regarding the gender variable, it should be noted that the gender categories are coded with the numbers zero (female) and one (male), and according to the beta value (0.208), men scored 20.8 percent higher than women in general political knowledge. Conclusion The level of general political knowledge of men is higher than that of women, and the number of options selected by women as "I don't know" is higher than that of men. As a result, it can be said that contrasting structural positions and contrasting responsibilities, resources, constraints and structural pressures resulting from socio-cultural conditions and women's reluctance to guess in answering questions affect the level of political knowledge of both sexes. Also, the education variable has the strongest relationship with the level of political knowledge; This relationship could be due to the motivation, opportunities, and abilities that education provides to the educated, as argued by Carpini and Keeter (1996), which increase their level of political knowledge. Also, the age variable is related to the level of political knowledge of individuals; this relationship could be due to the accumulation of objective experience and information that an individual acquires with increasing age, but with increasing age (age range 58 and above), the level of political knowledge decreases due to the weakening of cognitive ability, as pointed out by Lau and Redlawsk (2008). Finally, although income had a significant relationship with political knowledge, this relationship was less than 0.1; this situation could be due to the greater number of people with higher education in low-income groups.

https://jpq.ut.ac.ir/article_101100_dbabb6b561e6a8cc444331ce063a9d75.pdf

University of Tehran POLITICAL QUARTERLY 1735-9678 55 1 2025 04 05 Examining the Role and Influence of Policy Entrepreneurs in Policy Process Examining the Role and Influence of Policy Entrepreneurs in Policy Process 51 23 101101 10.22059/jpq.2024.384373.1008231 FA Ali Khaje Naieni Assistant Professor of Public Policy, Faculty of Law and Political Sciences, Allameh Tabatabai University, Tehran, Iran. Journal Article 2024 09 28 Introduction The concept of “policy entrepreneurs” was introduced as a theoretical concept in Kingdon’s research. Kingdon’s framework considers the role of the individual in the policy process to be important and explains why change may or may not occur. Kingdon calls these individuals entrepreneur who devote “time, energy, reputation, and sometimes money” to promoting their preferred solution for a policy problem. After Kingdon, this concept received much attention from many researchers and was developed in two directions. In the first direction, different researchers applied Kingdon’s framework to different study samples and empirically examined the roles of entrepreneurs that he listed. In the second direction, researchers, emphasizing some of the characteristics of entrepreneurs mentioned in Kingdon’s framework, modified and revised some of its dimensions, and criticized them. As a result, new features, tools, and generally new considerations were developed to clarify the theoretical potential of this concept, which are listed in different sections of this research. In summary, it should be said that the researchers' effort has been to examine empirical evidence and use an inductive approach to develop theoretical frameworks that enumerate the role of various individual and structural factors that enable or hinder the success of entrepreneurs in influencing the policy-making process. Therefore, the main question of this research is as folows: “what strategies do entrepreneurs use at the individual level to influence the public policy process and what stimuli or constraints do their actions face at the structural and environmental levels?” Accordingly, the main hypothesis of the research is that: the individual strategies used by entrepreneurs, such as the use of scientific evidence for persuasion, storytelling, networking, building policy coalitions/institutional changes, and political manipulation, play an important role in their influence on the policy-making process. Also, based on the three frameworks of multiple streams of Kingdon, advocacy coalitions, and policy narratives, different structural factors play a role in this context. The Research Method This qualitative study, by examining existing sources and emphasizing three theoretical frameworks in the field of public policymaking, namely multiple streams, advocacy coalitions, and policy narratives, examines the factors affecting the role-playing of entrepreneurs at the individual and structural levels. Accordingly, the types of entrepreneurs and their individual strategies are first described, and then, the role of structural and environmental factors in reducing the agency of entrepreneurs is discussed citing empirical examples. Results Most of the researches have overemphasized the power of entrepreneurs while downplaying the structural factors that shape their actions. In other words, the existing literature on policymaking tends to be agent-centric, placing individual deliberation at the heart of policymaking. It thus ignores broader structural conditions or simply dismisses them as “unpredictable” or “probable” factors. The central question here is that how entrepreneurs can generate new policy ideas who are institutionally present in a policymaking domain and subject to a set of regulatory, normative, and cognitive processes that constrain their cognition, define their interests, and produce their identities? This is because individuals must break the rules and procedures of the structures and institutions in which they are embedded in order to qualify as policymakers. To resolve this paradox, we must either avoid the extremes of voluntarism, in which agent autonomy is overemphasized—for example, in the multi-stream approach—or move toward the extremes of determinism, whereby policy outcomes are shaped by contextual forces. These deterministic approaches are at odds with the discourse of policy-making that has helped to direct policy analysis toward the study of actors and their role in catalyzing policy change. The internal environment in which entrepreneurs interact with each other plays a prominent role. Their behaviors and motivations can be determined by the organization to which they belong and their position in the political system. Furthermore, their position determines whether they can create effective social networks, communication channels, and opportunities for policy innovation. The institutionalist view of the policy-making process and policy change allows considerable scope for the influence of motivated individuals and groups. By highlighting the “logic of proportionality,” March and Olsen (1989) have shown the importance of actors’ deep knowledge of the procedures and norms of acceptable behavior. Organizational accounts show that attention to domestic sensitivities is crucial for effective policy change. On the other hand, it should be noted that at times, environmental considerations, including international ones, activate a particular type of national entrepreneurs. Conclusions The research findings showed that theoretical frameworks of policy-making take a different view of the degree of freedom of entrepreneurs and their level of activism in existing structures. The policy narrative framework emphasizes the relatively independent influence of entrepreneurs and downplays the role of structural factors in shaping their actions. This is while the multiple-stream and coalition frameworks emphasize the dominance of structural factors over entrepreneurs. Introduction The concept of “policy entrepreneurs” was introduced as a theoretical concept in Kingdon’s research. Kingdon’s framework considers the role of the individual in the policy process to be important and explains why change may or may not occur. Kingdon calls these individuals entrepreneur who devote “time, energy, reputation, and sometimes money” to promoting their preferred solution for a policy problem. After Kingdon, this concept received much attention from many researchers and was developed in two directions. In the first direction, different researchers applied Kingdon’s framework to different study samples and empirically examined the roles of entrepreneurs that he listed. In the second direction, researchers, emphasizing some of the characteristics of entrepreneurs mentioned in Kingdon’s framework, modified and revised some of its dimensions, and criticized them. As a result, new features, tools, and generally new considerations were developed to clarify the theoretical potential of this concept, which are listed in different sections of this research. In summary, it should be said that the researchers' effort has been to examine empirical evidence and use an inductive approach to develop theoretical frameworks that enumerate the role of various individual and structural factors that enable or hinder the success of entrepreneurs in influencing the policy-making process. Therefore, the main question of this research is as folows: “what strategies do entrepreneurs use at the individual level to influence the public policy process and what stimuli or constraints do their actions face at the structural and environmental levels?” Accordingly, the main hypothesis of the research is that: the individual strategies used by entrepreneurs, such as the use of scientific evidence for persuasion, storytelling, networking, building policy coalitions/institutional changes, and political manipulation, play an important role in their influence on the policy-making process. Also, based on the three frameworks of multiple streams of Kingdon, advocacy coalitions, and policy narratives, different structural factors play a role in this context. The Research Method This qualitative study, by examining existing sources and emphasizing three theoretical frameworks in the field of public policymaking, namely multiple streams, advocacy coalitions, and policy narratives, examines the factors affecting the role-playing of entrepreneurs at the individual and structural levels. Accordingly, the types of entrepreneurs and their individual strategies are first described, and then, the role of structural and environmental factors in reducing the agency of entrepreneurs is discussed citing empirical examples. Results Most of the researches have overemphasized the power of entrepreneurs while downplaying the structural factors that shape their actions. In other words, the existing literature on policymaking tends to be agent-centric, placing individual deliberation at the heart of policymaking. It thus ignores broader structural conditions or simply dismisses them as “unpredictable” or “probable” factors. The central question here is that how entrepreneurs can generate new policy ideas who are institutionally present in a policymaking domain and subject to a set of regulatory, normative, and cognitive processes that constrain their cognition, define their interests, and produce their identities? This is because individuals must break the rules and procedures of the structures and institutions in which they are embedded in order to qualify as policymakers. To resolve this paradox, we must either avoid the extremes of voluntarism, in which agent autonomy is overemphasized—for example, in the multi-stream approach—or move toward the extremes of determinism, whereby policy outcomes are shaped by contextual forces. These deterministic approaches are at odds with the discourse of policy-making that has helped to direct policy analysis toward the study of actors and their role in catalyzing policy change. The internal environment in which entrepreneurs interact with each other plays a prominent role. Their behaviors and motivations can be determined by the organization to which they belong and their position in the political system. Furthermore, their position determines whether they can create effective social networks, communication channels, and opportunities for policy innovation. The institutionalist view of the policy-making process and policy change allows considerable scope for the influence of motivated individuals and groups. By highlighting the “logic of proportionality,” March and Olsen (1989) have shown the importance of actors’ deep knowledge of the procedures and norms of acceptable behavior. Organizational accounts show that attention to domestic sensitivities is crucial for effective policy change. On the other hand, it should be noted that at times, environmental considerations, including international ones, activate a particular type of national entrepreneurs. Conclusions The research findings showed that theoretical frameworks of policy-making take a different view of the degree of freedom of entrepreneurs and their level of activism in existing structures. The policy narrative framework emphasizes the relatively independent influence of entrepreneurs and downplays the role of structural factors in shaping their actions. This is while the multiple-stream and coalition frameworks emphasize the dominance of structural factors over entrepreneurs.

https://jpq.ut.ac.ir/article_101101_129cc257a2dcc1c8dafaac9e2c5a82b5.pdf

University of Tehran POLITICAL QUARTERLY 1735-9678 55 1 2025 04 05 Pathology of the Political Selection Process in Iran's Presidential Elections Pathology of the Political Selection Process in Iran's Presidential Elections 85 53 101102 10.22059/jpq.2024.377529.1008186 FA Jalil Dara Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, Tarbiat Modares University, Tehran, Iran. Ebrahim Moslemi Arimi Ph.D. Studetn, Department of Political Science, Tarbiat Modares University, Tehran, Iran. Journal Article 2024 09 17 Introduction Political selection in Iran's presidential elections is a key process in determining the geometry of power in the Islamic Republic. Even though Iran is one of the countries with a long history in establishing the institution of elections, still, the process of electoral political selection has not reached the desired state and has faced many ups and downs. The fluctuating and sometimes unpredictable situation in the presentation of the list of approved candidates is one of the results of this situation, and as a result, there have been protests and dissatisfaction in the society and among the political activists. These damages make the necessity of conducting research in order to know their roots very serious. Methodology This article using the descriptive-analytic and retrospective analysis methods and based on the content analysis of the first-hand texts of political rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran and case and field studies of the process of political selection in the Islamic Republic of Iran, has dealt with the pathology of the process of political selection in the presidential elections of Iran. Results and discussion With the victory of the Islamic Revolution, the Assembly of Constitutional Law Experts started drafting the Constitution from August 19, 1979 to November 15 of the same year. In the framework of this law and based on the promise that the new political system is a republic, for the first time in the history of Iran, the post of president was defined in this law. The conditions of the president, the qualification review body and the election monitoring body are the most important coordinates in determining the political selection process in Iran's presidential elections, all of which are specified in the constitution. The findings show that the political selection process in Iran's presidential elections is damaged from two sources: 1- the content of legal texts, such as the quality of the laws, 2- executive and practical processes include lack of a legal basis for the role of parties in political selection, lack of a legal mechanism to require the selection body to state the documentation and reasoning bases of the examination of the qualifications, lack of a legal mechanism to hear candidates' explanations, lack of transparency in mechanisms, the possibility of applying taste in the preparation of queries, no legal prohibition of members of the Guardian Council to express biased political opinions, the silence of the law regarding conflict of interest situations and finally, establishing some effective approvals in reviewing qualifications without public announcement. Conclusion It seems that the best and most accessible solution to solve the aforementioned damages is to try to quantify and objectify the criteria. Policy recommendations include exemplary description of quality conditions, use of legal fiction, using a quorum to collect signatures from citizens as an aid in verifying qualifications, using a quorum to collect signatures from current and former officials of the system as an aid in verifying qualifications, creating an optional pre-registration system for candidates, determination of possible conflicts of interest, paying more attention to the issue of training executive agents in the qualification review mechanism, clarifying the qualification review mechanism, recognition of the role of parties to have their desired candidate in the elections within the framework of the constitution, adherence to the principle of Estes'hab, requiring the selection body to provide documentation and reasoning for unapproved candidates, determining the mechanism for hearing the explanations of unapproved candidates, official and public announcement of any legal resolution affecting qualifications, creating a legal prohibition for the activity and biased political opinion of members of the Guardian Council, legal prohibition of membership of persons with party and factional background in the Guardian Council, and finally using the capacity of the intra-party competition mechanism to select candidates. Introduction Political selection in Iran's presidential elections is a key process in determining the geometry of power in the Islamic Republic. Even though Iran is one of the countries with a long history in establishing the institution of elections, still, the process of electoral political selection has not reached the desired state and has faced many ups and downs. The fluctuating and sometimes unpredictable situation in the presentation of the list of approved candidates is one of the results of this situation, and as a result, there have been protests and dissatisfaction in the society and among the political activists. These damages make the necessity of conducting research in order to know their roots very serious. Methodology This article using the descriptive-analytic and retrospective analysis methods and based on the content analysis of the first-hand texts of political rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran and case and field studies of the process of political selection in the Islamic Republic of Iran, has dealt with the pathology of the process of political selection in the presidential elections of Iran. Results and discussion With the victory of the Islamic Revolution, the Assembly of Constitutional Law Experts started drafting the Constitution from August 19, 1979 to November 15 of the same year. In the framework of this law and based on the promise that the new political system is a republic, for the first time in the history of Iran, the post of president was defined in this law. The conditions of the president, the qualification review body and the election monitoring body are the most important coordinates in determining the political selection process in Iran's presidential elections, all of which are specified in the constitution. The findings show that the political selection process in Iran's presidential elections is damaged from two sources: 1- the content of legal texts, such as the quality of the laws, 2- executive and practical processes include lack of a legal basis for the role of parties in political selection, lack of a legal mechanism to require the selection body to state the documentation and reasoning bases of the examination of the qualifications, lack of a legal mechanism to hear candidates' explanations, lack of transparency in mechanisms, the possibility of applying taste in the preparation of queries, no legal prohibition of members of the Guardian Council to express biased political opinions, the silence of the law regarding conflict of interest situations and finally, establishing some effective approvals in reviewing qualifications without public announcement. Conclusion It seems that the best and most accessible solution to solve the aforementioned damages is to try to quantify and objectify the criteria. Policy recommendations include exemplary description of quality conditions, use of legal fiction, using a quorum to collect signatures from citizens as an aid in verifying qualifications, using a quorum to collect signatures from current and former officials of the system as an aid in verifying qualifications, creating an optional pre-registration system for candidates, determination of possible conflicts of interest, paying more attention to the issue of training executive agents in the qualification review mechanism, clarifying the qualification review mechanism, recognition of the role of parties to have their desired candidate in the elections within the framework of the constitution, adherence to the principle of Estes'hab, requiring the selection body to provide documentation and reasoning for unapproved candidates, determining the mechanism for hearing the explanations of unapproved candidates, official and public announcement of any legal resolution affecting qualifications, creating a legal prohibition for the activity and biased political opinion of members of the Guardian Council, legal prohibition of membership of persons with party and factional background in the Guardian Council, and finally using the capacity of the intra-party competition mechanism to select candidates.

https://jpq.ut.ac.ir/article_101102_984627b3a821eff60400611dc6c3f85c.pdf

University of Tehran POLITICAL QUARTERLY 1735-9678 55 1 2025 04 05 Internet and Technogeopolitics: Governance Patterns and Processes Internet and Technogeopolitics: Governance Patterns and Processes 123 87 101103 10.22059/jpq.2025.385491.1008247 FA Jalal Dorakhshah Professor, Department of Political Science, Imam Sadiq University, Tehran, Iran. Mohamad Mahdi Golshahi PhD Student in Public Policy, Islamic Azad University, Tehran, Iran. Journal Article 2024 11 07 Introduction The term "Internet" is used as a paradigm for flexibility, creativity, and freedom for development and evolution, freedom of expression, freedom of information, and free flow. This paradigm is sometimes referred to as the "open and free Internet" and refers to a broad range of protocols, services, and applications, as well as a set of interconnected networks that share a common transport protocol and pursue various economic, political, and cultural goals. This phenomenon owes much of its growth and survival to private developers, not only challenging governments with the need to share governance with the private sector and other stakeholders, such as technical associations and international organizations, but also acting as an emerging force that weakens traditional political boundaries. Under the concept of techno-geopolitics, it challenges the security and authority of states. If we define techno-geopolitics as the application of information, knowledge, and technology in altering the power hierarchy and the political behavior between states and tech companies, then it must be accepted that the geopolitics of information has confronted governments not only with new competitors, such as multinational corporations, but also transformed the political battleground from traditional geopolitical concepts like physical location, size, climate, topography, demographics, and natural resources to new concepts centered on knowledge and technology. These include government access to information, wealth, and communications, such as hacking and cyberattacks on other countries, economic capabilities like chip production, liquidity in financial markets, and investments in artificial intelligence. In this context, what is particularly important is how governments face new technologies in shaping Internet governance models, considering two key factors in this area: the ambiguity of international accountability and the uncertainty in how technology and Internet governance will evolve. Ambiguity of accountability refers to the dominance and misuse of the United States and its central role in domain name service provision (ICANN), which uses this technology as a strategic political tool in cyber warfare against countries opposing the U.S. The second issue, uncertainty, primarily refers to the lack of a unified governance model and the transition from the traditional governance model centered on the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. This transition creates a challenge of convergence and the balancing of interests among new stakeholders in governance, including markets, networks, and hierarchies, under multi-stakeholder governance, which is reflected in new legislation in the field. Governance is not defined by unilateral and imposed laws of national legislators or international bodies, but rather by a set of values, norms, cultures, soft laws, and hard laws, where sovereignty is seen as a public matter involving all stakeholders, including the private sector, civil society, and technical associations. Moreover, this uncertainty refers to the emergence of new economic markets, which have so far led to the formation of political-economic alliances such as the Five Eyes alliance, with the U.S. at its core, in response to China's technological development. This has resulted in an unpredictable global landscape in both the economic and political spheres. The present study aims to examine the Internet governance models, identifying their similarities and differences, in order to identify the most effective model in the era of technological conflict. In this regard, it addresses the following questions: first, what governance models has Internet governance followed over the past two decades? what similarities and differences exist between these models? how are the interests of stakeholders addressed in these models, and with what methods? Lastly, how is the relationship between techno-geopolitics and governance represented in the framework of governance models. Materials and Methods The conceptual framework of this research is based on two key concepts: Internet governance with a focus on identifying stakeholders and the scope of government authority, and techno-geopolitics with an emphasis on technological conflict. In this regard, the study traces the evolution of Internet governance through three key phases: the formation of the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS), which was an attempt to organize an internet community similar to the United Nations; the transition from the dominance of ICANN (formerly AIANA) in 2013 and the introduction of the four core principles of the Internet (ROAM), which include access to the internet as a human right, freedom of information as a public right, universal access without restriction, and finally, the multi-stakeholder governance model as the model for Internet governance; and the shift to the technological conflict arena between China and the U.S. and their allies following the sanctions and expulsion of Huawei from the United States in 2018. These three phases represent the central transformation of the internet and technology. Taking into account the concept of techno-geopolitics and Internet governance, this study employs Philip Mayering's qualitative analysis method within an inductive approach, structured in three stages: data collection and organization, coding and categorization to explain the various models of Internet governance. Results and Discussion The central question of this research was that what evolutionary path has Internet governance taken, and what are the similarities and differences between the various governance models in this field? Additionally, the subsidiary question addressed the relationship between techno-geopolitics and Internet governance. In response, it can be stated that there are two main approaches to Internet governance: the military-security approach and the economic approach. The nine governance models in this field, developed after the formation of ICANN and the Information Society community, have emerged under the economic approach. These models, while addressing two central issues of the Internet and technology—namely, the ambiguity in the accountability of domestic and international institutions and the use of the Internet as a political tool under techno-geopolitics, as well as the uncertainty surrounding technology development and its positioning in domestic and foreign economies based on government interests—have evolved. In its most basic form, the anarchistic model, which focuses on a cultural-philosophical approach to the Internet, emphasizes decentralization, openness, equality, and anonymity. The outcome of this governance model is the formation of cryptocurrencies and investments in VPNs to preserve the freedom of information without regard to government interests. The two central components of Internet governance—ambiguity and uncertainty—are evident here. The hierarchical governance model, focusing on the ambiguity of Internet security challenges such as cyberattacks and the lack of accountability of the ICANN, places the interests of Internet stakeholders—from users to the private sector—under the security interests of governments. In this context, two opposing governance models, global and national, have emerged. The result has been the formation of the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) and an effort to find a middle ground with a focus on consensus-based, democratic, and ultimately multi-stakeholder governance. In the consensual and democratic governance model, the focus is on recognizing the rights of stakeholders and responding to the needs of the second and third generations of the Internet, i.e., the formation of social networks and cryptocurrencies, through two democratic models: consultative and participatory democracy. In the democratic model, key components such as power balance, veto rights, and decision-making independence are explored, yet the main challenge remains the guarantee of stakeholders' rights at both domestic and international levels and the development of an applicable model aligned with technological advancements, such as cryptocurrencies and artificial intelligence.The solution lies in the rise of multi-stakeholder governance to address the interests of stakeholders, especially the private sector and technical associations, to promote technological development. This model introduces a new governance paradigm based on four key elements: sustainability, networking, international community-building, and the freedom of information. These elements are aligned with UNESCO's four principles of the Internet. While this model addresses the two challenges of ambiguity and uncertainty in technological development, it also moves towards harmonizing the standards for Internet services across countries. Furthermore, it creates international pressure on countries that restrict the Internet, facilitating broader access for people. By establishing cyber-interpol and creating a platform for international accountability, this model aims to respond to challenges such as cyberattacks. Although this model faces execution challenges, it represents a significant step in aligning technological standards with the four principles of freedom of information, universal access, human rights, and multi-stakeholder governance, both domestically and internationally. It suggests that by accepting the risks associated with the Internet and technologies such as hacking and cyber-sabotage, countries can foster economic competition and technological development while reducing cyber risks through the participation of internal and external stakeholders. Conclusion The conclusion of this research, which uses the framework of Internet governance and techno-geopolitics, based on the two concepts of ambiguity (including how international institutions respond to risks such as data theft and hacking) and uncertainty (based on how technology develops and the formation of new markets and countries' share in these markets), is that the transformations in the second and third generations of the Internet, along with the technological conflicts emerging under the concept of techno-geopolitics, compel governments to adopt a multi-stakeholder governance model. Therefore, the relationship between Internet governance and techno-geopolitics can be observed in multi-stakeholder governance at three levels: Domestic level: This includes considering veto rights for stakeholders and ensuring government accountability towards stakeholders' rights in policymaking in the areas of Internet and technology. 2. Regional level: This includes the formation of alliances such as the six ASEAN countries, and at 3. the transnational and global level: cooperation between China, private companies, and EU governments to control technology pricing and reduce the influence of the Five Eyes alliance. Although the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) conferences aim to shape a global multi-stakeholder governance model, the technological conflict reduces this model to the domestic and regional levels. The innovation of this research lies in its reliance on primary sources within this field to explain this transformation, namely techno-geopolitics and Internet governance, and to examine the evolution of Internet governance models, including anarchistic, hierarchical (bureaucratic, oligarchic, meritocratic), hybrid, hierarchical-anarchistic, democratic, consensual, and finally, multi-stakeholder governance. This progression had not been addressed in previous research. This study, by comparing Internet governance and technological conflict, paves the way for further research on techno-geopolitics, the new equations in international relations, and the exploration of Internet governance models in light of emerging technologies. Based on these findings, the following recommendations are made: Examine the evolution of Internet governance in Iran. Assess the country's capabilities in techno-geopolitics to conduct a diagnosis for dealing with cyberattacks and emerging economic sectors such as artificial intelligence and digital currency. Compare and analyze Internet governance models in China, the United States, Russia, and the European Union as reference models for Internet governance. Evaluate and assess the feasibility of multi-stakeholder governance in Iran. Analyze and position Iran in the context of the global technological equations to balance political power. Introduction The term "Internet" is used as a paradigm for flexibility, creativity, and freedom for development and evolution, freedom of expression, freedom of information, and free flow. This paradigm is sometimes referred to as the "open and free Internet" and refers to a broad range of protocols, services, and applications, as well as a set of interconnected networks that share a common transport protocol and pursue various economic, political, and cultural goals. This phenomenon owes much of its growth and survival to private developers, not only challenging governments with the need to share governance with the private sector and other stakeholders, such as technical associations and international organizations, but also acting as an emerging force that weakens traditional political boundaries. Under the concept of techno-geopolitics, it challenges the security and authority of states. If we define techno-geopolitics as the application of information, knowledge, and technology in altering the power hierarchy and the political behavior between states and tech companies, then it must be accepted that the geopolitics of information has confronted governments not only with new competitors, such as multinational corporations, but also transformed the political battleground from traditional geopolitical concepts like physical location, size, climate, topography, demographics, and natural resources to new concepts centered on knowledge and technology. These include government access to information, wealth, and communications, such as hacking and cyberattacks on other countries, economic capabilities like chip production, liquidity in financial markets, and investments in artificial intelligence. In this context, what is particularly important is how governments face new technologies in shaping Internet governance models, considering two key factors in this area: the ambiguity of international accountability and the uncertainty in how technology and Internet governance will evolve. Ambiguity of accountability refers to the dominance and misuse of the United States and its central role in domain name service provision (ICANN), which uses this technology as a strategic political tool in cyber warfare against countries opposing the U.S. The second issue, uncertainty, primarily refers to the lack of a unified governance model and the transition from the traditional governance model centered on the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. This transition creates a challenge of convergence and the balancing of interests among new stakeholders in governance, including markets, networks, and hierarchies, under multi-stakeholder governance, which is reflected in new legislation in the field. Governance is not defined by unilateral and imposed laws of national legislators or international bodies, but rather by a set of values, norms, cultures, soft laws, and hard laws, where sovereignty is seen as a public matter involving all stakeholders, including the private sector, civil society, and technical associations. Moreover, this uncertainty refers to the emergence of new economic markets, which have so far led to the formation of political-economic alliances such as the Five Eyes alliance, with the U.S. at its core, in response to China's technological development. This has resulted in an unpredictable global landscape in both the economic and political spheres. The present study aims to examine the Internet governance models, identifying their similarities and differences, in order to identify the most effective model in the era of technological conflict. In this regard, it addresses the following questions: first, what governance models has Internet governance followed over the past two decades? what similarities and differences exist between these models? how are the interests of stakeholders addressed in these models, and with what methods? Lastly, how is the relationship between techno-geopolitics and governance represented in the framework of governance models. Materials and Methods The conceptual framework of this research is based on two key concepts: Internet governance with a focus on identifying stakeholders and the scope of government authority, and techno-geopolitics with an emphasis on technological conflict. In this regard, the study traces the evolution of Internet governance through three key phases: the formation of the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS), which was an attempt to organize an internet community similar to the United Nations; the transition from the dominance of ICANN (formerly AIANA) in 2013 and the introduction of the four core principles of the Internet (ROAM), which include access to the internet as a human right, freedom of information as a public right, universal access without restriction, and finally, the multi-stakeholder governance model as the model for Internet governance; and the shift to the technological conflict arena between China and the U.S. and their allies following the sanctions and expulsion of Huawei from the United States in 2018. These three phases represent the central transformation of the internet and technology. Taking into account the concept of techno-geopolitics and Internet governance, this study employs Philip Mayering's qualitative analysis method within an inductive approach, structured in three stages: data collection and organization, coding and categorization to explain the various models of Internet governance. Results and Discussion The central question of this research was that what evolutionary path has Internet governance taken, and what are the similarities and differences between the various governance models in this field? Additionally, the subsidiary question addressed the relationship between techno-geopolitics and Internet governance. In response, it can be stated that there are two main approaches to Internet governance: the military-security approach and the economic approach. The nine governance models in this field, developed after the formation of ICANN and the Information Society community, have emerged under the economic approach. These models, while addressing two central issues of the Internet and technology—namely, the ambiguity in the accountability of domestic and international institutions and the use of the Internet as a political tool under techno-geopolitics, as well as the uncertainty surrounding technology development and its positioning in domestic and foreign economies based on government interests—have evolved. In its most basic form, the anarchistic model, which focuses on a cultural-philosophical approach to the Internet, emphasizes decentralization, openness, equality, and anonymity. The outcome of this governance model is the formation of cryptocurrencies and investments in VPNs to preserve the freedom of information without regard to government interests. The two central components of Internet governance—ambiguity and uncertainty—are evident here. The hierarchical governance model, focusing on the ambiguity of Internet security challenges such as cyberattacks and the lack of accountability of the ICANN, places the interests of Internet stakeholders—from users to the private sector—under the security interests of governments. In this context, two opposing governance models, global and national, have emerged. The result has been the formation of the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) and an effort to find a middle ground with a focus on consensus-based, democratic, and ultimately multi-stakeholder governance. In the consensual and democratic governance model, the focus is on recognizing the rights of stakeholders and responding to the needs of the second and third generations of the Internet, i.e., the formation of social networks and cryptocurrencies, through two democratic models: consultative and participatory democracy. In the democratic model, key components such as power balance, veto rights, and decision-making independence are explored, yet the main challenge remains the guarantee of stakeholders' rights at both domestic and international levels and the development of an applicable model aligned with technological advancements, such as cryptocurrencies and artificial intelligence.The solution lies in the rise of multi-stakeholder governance to address the interests of stakeholders, especially the private sector and technical associations, to promote technological development. This model introduces a new governance paradigm based on four key elements: sustainability, networking, international community-building, and the freedom of information. These elements are aligned with UNESCO's four principles of the Internet. While this model addresses the two challenges of ambiguity and uncertainty in technological development, it also moves towards harmonizing the standards for Internet services across countries. Furthermore, it creates international pressure on countries that restrict the Internet, facilitating broader access for people. By establishing cyber-interpol and creating a platform for international accountability, this model aims to respond to challenges such as cyberattacks. Although this model faces execution challenges, it represents a significant step in aligning technological standards with the four principles of freedom of information, universal access, human rights, and multi-stakeholder governance, both domestically and internationally. It suggests that by accepting the risks associated with the Internet and technologies such as hacking and cyber-sabotage, countries can foster economic competition and technological development while reducing cyber risks through the participation of internal and external stakeholders. Conclusion The conclusion of this research, which uses the framework of Internet governance and techno-geopolitics, based on the two concepts of ambiguity (including how international institutions respond to risks such as data theft and hacking) and uncertainty (based on how technology develops and the formation of new markets and countries' share in these markets), is that the transformations in the second and third generations of the Internet, along with the technological conflicts emerging under the concept of techno-geopolitics, compel governments to adopt a multi-stakeholder governance model. Therefore, the relationship between Internet governance and techno-geopolitics can be observed in multi-stakeholder governance at three levels: Domestic level: This includes considering veto rights for stakeholders and ensuring government accountability towards stakeholders' rights in policymaking in the areas of Internet and technology. 2. Regional level: This includes the formation of alliances such as the six ASEAN countries, and at 3. the transnational and global level: cooperation between China, private companies, and EU governments to control technology pricing and reduce the influence of the Five Eyes alliance. Although the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) conferences aim to shape a global multi-stakeholder governance model, the technological conflict reduces this model to the domestic and regional levels. The innovation of this research lies in its reliance on primary sources within this field to explain this transformation, namely techno-geopolitics and Internet governance, and to examine the evolution of Internet governance models, including anarchistic, hierarchical (bureaucratic, oligarchic, meritocratic), hybrid, hierarchical-anarchistic, democratic, consensual, and finally, multi-stakeholder governance. This progression had not been addressed in previous research. This study, by comparing Internet governance and technological conflict, paves the way for further research on techno-geopolitics, the new equations in international relations, and the exploration of Internet governance models in light of emerging technologies. Based on these findings, the following recommendations are made: Examine the evolution of Internet governance in Iran. Assess the country's capabilities in techno-geopolitics to conduct a diagnosis for dealing with cyberattacks and emerging economic sectors such as artificial intelligence and digital currency. Compare and analyze Internet governance models in China, the United States, Russia, and the European Union as reference models for Internet governance. Evaluate and assess the feasibility of multi-stakeholder governance in Iran. Analyze and position Iran in the context of the global technological equations to balance political power.

https://jpq.ut.ac.ir/article_101103_67e98efe795452e800e140bbad4b3a29.pdf

University of Tehran POLITICAL QUARTERLY 1735-9678 55 1 2025 04 05 Understanding the “Oedipal” Foundations of the Political:Political Theology or Cultural Theology? Understanding the “Oedipal” Foundations of the Political:Political Theology or Cultural Theology? 152 125 101104 10.22059/jpq.2025.384565.1008233 FA Mohammad Abdolahpour Chenari Assistant Professor, Faculty Member, Department of Political Science, Shahid Bahonar University of Kerman, Iran. Journal Article 2024 11 03 Introduction In modern political discourse, from Hobbes to Schmitt, the underlying premise has often rested on the theological concept of “God.” Thomas Hobbes, in his seminal work *Leviathan*, articulates the authority of the ruler by asserting that “the natural right of God to rule over men and to punish them for breaking the laws... does not arise from the need for obedience and gratitude of men for the benefit of his creation, but that right must be considered the result of the irresistible power of God” (Hobbes, 2005: 317). This assertion establishes that the ruler’s authority is fundamentally rooted in a theological understanding of God’s omnipotence, rendering the ruler’s power indestructible by divine supremacy. Carl Schmitt, in his twentieth-century reflection on Hobbesian thought in *Political Theology*, further elaborates on this idea, famously stating, “The ruler decides on exceptions... The concept that has become commonplace is theological, that is, the transfer of these concepts from theology to the theory of the state, through which, for example, omnipotence has emerged in the form of an absolute legislator” (Schmitt, 2015: 29 and 61). The commonalities in the propositions presented by both thinkers encapsulate several foundational assumptions. Firstly, political theology inherently implicates the notion of sovereignty. Secondly, there exists a “structural/formal similarity” between legal and theological constructs, such as the parallels drawn between the divine order and societal organization, as well as between the ruler and God (Taubs, 1399). Thirdly, both perspectives delineate an antagonistic distinction between friend and enemy within theological and political domains (Schmidt, 1393b: 35). Fourthly, the framework of political theology is predicated upon an intrinsic faith in obedience (Mayer, 1393: 193). Lastly, the theological-type ruler possesses the ultimate right to life and death over subjects, grounded in the assertion that “the omnipotence of the state... is a kind of omnipotence of God” (Schmidt, 1393b: 45), thus framing political authority as a derivative of the theological conception of divinity. Conversely, the twentieth century witnessed efforts to extricate the concept of God from political thought, endeavoring to divest it of its theological dimensions. Notably, Hans Kelsen, in his article “the Concept of the State and Social Psychology with Special Reference to Freud” (Kelsen, 1924) sought to reconceptualize the state through the lens of Freudian mass psychology, positing a connection between the empirical realities of statecraft and its intrinsic nature. This analytical approach signifies a paradigm shift where a scientific worldview supplants the theological framework governing political relationships. In his later works, such as “The Form of the State and the Worldview” (Kelsen, 1973b) and “God and the State” (Kelsen, 1973a), Kelsen further elaborates on the absence of the divine image in the realm of politics, rendering the omnipotent ruler as a mere observer. Through Kelsen's transformation of theological concepts into a form of “natural theology,” he illustrates how scientific rationality undermines the structural analogies between legal and theological ideations, effectively obscuring the notion of God from political discourse. In this transitional framework, the “transcendental” ruler—initially endowed with the right to determine life and death within society—emerges as an “internally permanent” power, stripped of the transcendental authority once attributed to it (Kelsen, 20007: 527). Consequently, the law is reduced to an “absolute command,” devoid of intrinsic values and emotions, and is recast solely as a construct of human reason (Kant, 1381: 40-44). As a result, the traditional understanding of the law, grounded in fundamental order (*Recht*), is replaced by a legal system defined by mere rules (*Gesetz*). This shift signifies a profound transformation in the relationship between theology and politics, reflecting the broader secularization of political discourse in the modern era. Method In Hans Kelsen's reductionist view, while certain elements of Freud's mass theory were acknowledged, much of his thought was overlooked, particularly regarding the father-child relationship and the role of instincts. Furthermore, the omission of God's name in Kelsen's theology suggests a cosmological perspective that excludes “God as an alien” (Tillich, 1997: 18) from the state. However, this alienation of the state from God can be reconsidered by adopting an ontological approach inspired by Paul Tillich's cultural theology. Such a reexamination emphasizes the significance of the father-son relationship and the interplay of libido and ego instincts in analyzing the patricidal drive in politics, particularly within fantasy contexts. This approach opens new avenues for understanding the concept of sovereignty in political theology and addresses a fundamental question: Does political collapse stem from theological factors or cultural-psychological dynamics? Furthermore, what are the underlying foundations of this collapse? Generally, this article aims to explore an alternative path by reintegrating the idea of the father into political discourse and addressing the aforementioned fundamental issue. A cultural-psychological approach will be employed to tackle this topic by drawing on the insights of Tillich and Freud. Consequently, the discussion will examine whether patricide is fundamentally a psychological or legal issue. Additionally, three aspects of the father figure, God, and the king, will be analyzed. In conclusion, a summary of findings and references will be provided. Results The findings suggest that analyzing politics through the lens of paternal figures—specifically concepts such as the Oedipus complex and the notion of castration, ideas not commonly explored in political analyses—reveals significant insights. When considering figures like Hans Kelsen, it becomes evident that this perspective is largely shaped by the masses’ identification with political rulers. By retaining the idea of “God” as central to politics, we can more effectively understand the metaphorical “murder” of the three fantasies of the father: the father as parent, the father as God, and the father as king. The first observation is that within the home environment, a child's initial fantasy regarding the political ruler closely mirrors their perception of the father as the parent. This recognition forms the foundation for the child's earliest political feelings toward the father, particularly the notion of “patricide,” as the father is perceived as an obstacle to the child's sexual desires. The second observation suggests that as the child matures, they encounter the concept of God in their cultural surroundings. While named God, this figure reflects their understanding of the father from the home environment. Here, God embodies a fantasy of the father, imposing taboos and limitations on desires through commandments and prohibitions, prompting the child to mentally “overcome” this figure as well. Lastly, as the political ruler, the father seeks to restrict the child's desires and aspirations through societal laws, positioning himself as an adversary in the child’s mind, much like the father figure. Consequently, the child harbors an unconscious desire to “eliminate” this ruler, though such impulses seldom materialize in reality. Discussion and Conclusion Contrary to the prevailing view in political theology, the commandment “Thou shalt not kill” in politics has psychological foundations. Particularly when the collapse of power is at stake, this issue is more closely tied to the subjective, or mental, aspect of politics than to the objective, concrete structures of political institutions. Thus, if politics is viewed through the lens of the natural, the idea of the father comes into focus. At this point, the fantasy of the father-parent extends into the political realm, and the ruler is perceived through the lens of the natural father. The political subject, in turn, forms reciprocal and transitory feelings toward the ruler. Consequently, politics becomes a subject of negative and positive passions and emotions, such as hate and love. When politics obstructs the expression of the subject's desires, it leads to the repression of those frustrated desires while simultaneously fostering feelings of resentment and fear within the subject. However, when politics is shaken by natural or political crises, subjects alleviate the psychological burden of suppressed desires by expressing happiness, even as they continue to adhere to the survival of the political order. When politics is viewed through a cultural lens, the fantasy of a sovereign God emerges in political relations. This subjective God stands in contrast to the theological God, whose existence does not depend on the thoughts and beliefs of the subjects. Like the natural father, this subjective God undergoes death and decay, particularly when individuals experience, associate, or imagine painful and tragic events in their personal lives. In these moments of terror, the agent responsible for the failure of desires and wishes is perceived as the mental God. Even in dire circumstances, when individuals appeal to this idea but receive no response, the psychological outcome is the death of the mental God. For the subjects, the death of the mental God signifies the death of its associated figure—the ruler. It is under these conditions that the political ruler reaches the peak of mental death and collapse within the political community, paving the way for natural collapse and objective death. Introduction In modern political discourse, from Hobbes to Schmitt, the underlying premise has often rested on the theological concept of “God.” Thomas Hobbes, in his seminal work *Leviathan*, articulates the authority of the ruler by asserting that “the natural right of God to rule over men and to punish them for breaking the laws... does not arise from the need for obedience and gratitude of men for the benefit of his creation, but that right must be considered the result of the irresistible power of God” (Hobbes, 2005: 317). This assertion establishes that the ruler’s authority is fundamentally rooted in a theological understanding of God’s omnipotence, rendering the ruler’s power indestructible by divine supremacy. Carl Schmitt, in his twentieth-century reflection on Hobbesian thought in *Political Theology*, further elaborates on this idea, famously stating, “The ruler decides on exceptions... The concept that has become commonplace is theological, that is, the transfer of these concepts from theology to the theory of the state, through which, for example, omnipotence has emerged in the form of an absolute legislator” (Schmitt, 2015: 29 and 61). The commonalities in the propositions presented by both thinkers encapsulate several foundational assumptions. Firstly, political theology inherently implicates the notion of sovereignty. Secondly, there exists a “structural/formal similarity” between legal and theological constructs, such as the parallels drawn between the divine order and societal organization, as well as between the ruler and God (Taubs, 1399). Thirdly, both perspectives delineate an antagonistic distinction between friend and enemy within theological and political domains (Schmidt, 1393b: 35). Fourthly, the framework of political theology is predicated upon an intrinsic faith in obedience (Mayer, 1393: 193). Lastly, the theological-type ruler possesses the ultimate right to life and death over subjects, grounded in the assertion that “the omnipotence of the state... is a kind of omnipotence of God” (Schmidt, 1393b: 45), thus framing political authority as a derivative of the theological conception of divinity. Conversely, the twentieth century witnessed efforts to extricate the concept of God from political thought, endeavoring to divest it of its theological dimensions. Notably, Hans Kelsen, in his article “the Concept of the State and Social Psychology with Special Reference to Freud” (Kelsen, 1924) sought to reconceptualize the state through the lens of Freudian mass psychology, positing a connection between the empirical realities of statecraft and its intrinsic nature. This analytical approach signifies a paradigm shift where a scientific worldview supplants the theological framework governing political relationships. In his later works, such as “The Form of the State and the Worldview” (Kelsen, 1973b) and “God and the State” (Kelsen, 1973a), Kelsen further elaborates on the absence of the divine image in the realm of politics, rendering the omnipotent ruler as a mere observer. Through Kelsen's transformation of theological concepts into a form of “natural theology,” he illustrates how scientific rationality undermines the structural analogies between legal and theological ideations, effectively obscuring the notion of God from political discourse. In this transitional framework, the “transcendental” ruler—initially endowed with the right to determine life and death within society—emerges as an “internally permanent” power, stripped of the transcendental authority once attributed to it (Kelsen, 20007: 527). Consequently, the law is reduced to an “absolute command,” devoid of intrinsic values and emotions, and is recast solely as a construct of human reason (Kant, 1381: 40-44). As a result, the traditional understanding of the law, grounded in fundamental order (*Recht*), is replaced by a legal system defined by mere rules (*Gesetz*). This shift signifies a profound transformation in the relationship between theology and politics, reflecting the broader secularization of political discourse in the modern era. Method In Hans Kelsen's reductionist view, while certain elements of Freud's mass theory were acknowledged, much of his thought was overlooked, particularly regarding the father-child relationship and the role of instincts. Furthermore, the omission of God's name in Kelsen's theology suggests a cosmological perspective that excludes “God as an alien” (Tillich, 1997: 18) from the state. However, this alienation of the state from God can be reconsidered by adopting an ontological approach inspired by Paul Tillich's cultural theology. Such a reexamination emphasizes the significance of the father-son relationship and the interplay of libido and ego instincts in analyzing the patricidal drive in politics, particularly within fantasy contexts. This approach opens new avenues for understanding the concept of sovereignty in political theology and addresses a fundamental question: Does political collapse stem from theological factors or cultural-psychological dynamics? Furthermore, what are the underlying foundations of this collapse? Generally, this article aims to explore an alternative path by reintegrating the idea of the father into political discourse and addressing the aforementioned fundamental issue. A cultural-psychological approach will be employed to tackle this topic by drawing on the insights of Tillich and Freud. Consequently, the discussion will examine whether patricide is fundamentally a psychological or legal issue. Additionally, three aspects of the father figure, God, and the king, will be analyzed. In conclusion, a summary of findings and references will be provided. Results The findings suggest that analyzing politics through the lens of paternal figures—specifically concepts such as the Oedipus complex and the notion of castration, ideas not commonly explored in political analyses—reveals significant insights. When considering figures like Hans Kelsen, it becomes evident that this perspective is largely shaped by the masses’ identification with political rulers. By retaining the idea of “God” as central to politics, we can more effectively understand the metaphorical “murder” of the three fantasies of the father: the father as parent, the father as God, and the father as king. The first observation is that within the home environment, a child's initial fantasy regarding the political ruler closely mirrors their perception of the father as the parent. This recognition forms the foundation for the child's earliest political feelings toward the father, particularly the notion of “patricide,” as the father is perceived as an obstacle to the child's sexual desires. The second observation suggests that as the child matures, they encounter the concept of God in their cultural surroundings. While named God, this figure reflects their understanding of the father from the home environment. Here, God embodies a fantasy of the father, imposing taboos and limitations on desires through commandments and prohibitions, prompting the child to mentally “overcome” this figure as well. Lastly, as the political ruler, the father seeks to restrict the child's desires and aspirations through societal laws, positioning himself as an adversary in the child’s mind, much like the father figure. Consequently, the child harbors an unconscious desire to “eliminate” this ruler, though such impulses seldom materialize in reality. Discussion and Conclusion Contrary to the prevailing view in political theology, the commandment “Thou shalt not kill” in politics has psychological foundations. Particularly when the collapse of power is at stake, this issue is more closely tied to the subjective, or mental, aspect of politics than to the objective, concrete structures of political institutions. Thus, if politics is viewed through the lens of the natural, the idea of the father comes into focus. At this point, the fantasy of the father-parent extends into the political realm, and the ruler is perceived through the lens of the natural father. The political subject, in turn, forms reciprocal and transitory feelings toward the ruler. Consequently, politics becomes a subject of negative and positive passions and emotions, such as hate and love. When politics obstructs the expression of the subject's desires, it leads to the repression of those frustrated desires while simultaneously fostering feelings of resentment and fear within the subject. However, when politics is shaken by natural or political crises, subjects alleviate the psychological burden of suppressed desires by expressing happiness, even as they continue to adhere to the survival of the political order. When politics is viewed through a cultural lens, the fantasy of a sovereign God emerges in political relations. This subjective God stands in contrast to the theological God, whose existence does not depend on the thoughts and beliefs of the subjects. Like the natural father, this subjective God undergoes death and decay, particularly when individuals experience, associate, or imagine painful and tragic events in their personal lives. In these moments of terror, the agent responsible for the failure of desires and wishes is perceived as the mental God. Even in dire circumstances, when individuals appeal to this idea but receive no response, the psychological outcome is the death of the mental God. For the subjects, the death of the mental God signifies the death of its associated figure—the ruler. It is under these conditions that the political ruler reaches the peak of mental death and collapse within the political community, paving the way for natural collapse and objective death.

https://jpq.ut.ac.ir/article_101104_a671628d34e145cd80c6dea932e56422.pdf

University of Tehran POLITICAL QUARTERLY 1735-9678 55 1 2025 04 05 Investigation of the Impact of Economic Competition between China and the US on South Africa from 2010 to 2023 Investigation of the Impact of Economic Competition between China and the US on South Africa from 2010 to 2023 187 153 101108 10.22059/jpq.2024.383939.1008227 FA Amir Bahram Arab Ahmadi Associate Professor, Department of West Asian and African Studies, Faculty of World Studies, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran. Mahdi Samavati MA., Department of West Asian and African Studies, Faculty of World Studies, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran. Journal Article 2024 11 02 Introduction South Africa, as Africa’s second-largest economy and a major industrial hub, finds itself at the center of the economic and political rivalry between China and the United States. Both global powers seek to expand their influence through economic cooperation, albeit with differing priorities. China has concentrated its efforts on securing minerals, energy resources, and infrastructure development, while the United States emphasizes democracy, human rights, and trade relations. This dynamic competition significantly shapes South Africa’s economic growth and political trajectory, influencing its development strategies and global partnerships. Recognizing the profound implications of this rivalry, this study aims to explore its multifaceted dimensions and assess its broader impacts on South Africa’s economy and political landscape. The article’s theoretical framework is based on Robert Gilpin’s theory of hegemonic stability, which examines power dynamics within the international system, particularly in economic contexts. This theory suggests that global stability is maintained when a single hegemonic power dominates, but the rise of emerging powers, such as China and the United States, disrupts this equilibrium, leading to significant shifts in global power structures. In the context of South Africa, the competition between these two nations reflects their broader struggle for hegemonic influence in Southern Africa, with far-reaching consequences for both regional development and the global economic order. Additionally, the framework incorporates the concept of economic imperialism, highlighting how dominant nations extend their influence over weaker states through strategic investments and economic leverage. Together, these theoretical perspectives provide a lens for understanding the complex interplay of power, competition, and economic dominance shaping South Africa’s position in the global arena. The research method The study utilizes a comparative research method, a fundamental approach in social sciences for analyzing international relations and policies. By identifying similarities and differences, this method uncovers behavioral patterns and interactions between key actors. The research specifically examines the economic competition between China and the United States in South Africa through a case-based comparative lens, focusing on their investment strategies and the resulting impacts on the country’s economy and political landscape. Data is drawn from a variety of sources, including academic literature, international reports, and statistical analyses, to provide a comprehensive understanding of the broader consequences of this rivalry on South Africa’s development trajectory. Discussion The economic relations of both China and the United States with South Africa and other African nations are deeply shaped by the political, economic, and social histories of these regions. Since the Cold War, both powers have actively sought to expand their influence across Africa, though their approaches and strategies have diverged significantly. China has prioritized economic engagement through infrastructure development, resource extraction, and trade, often framed within initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative. In contrast, the United States has emphasized democracy promotion, human rights, and trade partnerships, aligning its efforts with broader geopolitical goals. These differing strategies reflect the unique historical contexts and priorities of each nation, while also highlighting the evolving dynamics of global power competition in Africa. China has emerged as one of South Africa’s largest trading partners, significantly expanding its economic relations since 2000. By 2023, the trade volume between the two nations reached $42 billion, marking a substantial increase over the years. South Africa’s exports to China grew from $8 billion in 2010 to $12 billion in 2023, while imports from China surged from $11 billion to $21 billion during the same period. This growing trade relationship underscores South Africa’s increasing reliance on Chinese goods and the deepening of commercial ties. China’s engagement in South Africa spans several key areas, including investment and infrastructure, where it has funded transportation and energy projects such as roads, bridges, and solar energy initiatives. In transportation and logistics, China has collaborated on developing ports and rail lines, including the Cape Town-Pretoria railway project. Additionally, China is a major exporter of goods to South Africa, supplying machinery, electronics, and construction materials, further solidifying its role in the country’s trade and industrial sectors. Conversely, the United States, as the world’s largest economy, has made significant investments in South Africa, particularly in technology, education, and healthcare. From 2010 to 2023, U.S. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in South Africa increased from $5.13 billion to $18.36 billion, indicating a steady upward trend. American tech giants like Google and Microsoft have been instrumental in advancing South Africa’s digital economy, with Microsoft notably establishing a $300 million cloud data center in the country. In the areas of education and healthcare, the U.S. has committed substantial resources, including over $7 billion for health programs focused on combating infectious diseases. These investments underscore the United States' dedication to fostering long-term development and capacity building in South Africa, contrasting with China’s emphasis on infrastructure and trade. Together, the economic activities of both nations reflect their strategic efforts to strengthen influence in South Africa, each utilizing distinct approaches to shape the country’s economic and social landscape. South Africa's exports to the United States have experienced notable fluctuations from 2010 to 2023, rising from $7.15 billion in 2010 to $8.43 billion in 2023. In parallel, imports from the U.S. have also fluctuated due to varying economic conditions and changes in trade policies. In contrast, China, one of South Africa's largest trading partners, achieved a trade volume of $42 billion in 2023. China remains a key exporter of goods to South Africa, supplying a diverse range of products, including machinery, electronics, and construction materials. The political impact of China on South Africa is primarily evident through the expansion of economic and diplomatic relations. By establishing infrastructure projects and increasing investments in the country, China aims to enhance its influence across Africa. The close ties between the two nations, highlighted by their participation in organizations such as BRICS and G77, reflect China's commitment to bolstering South Africa's economic and political standing. These connections position China as a strategic partner and a crucial source of funding for the development of South African infrastructure. As a global power, the United States has sought to maintain its influence in South Africa, though recent years have posed challenges. During the Obama administration, relations were strengthened, reflecting his African roots. However, subsequent political changes in the U.S. have negatively impacted these relations. The U.S. has worked to protect its interests in South Africa by providing economic aid and development programs. Nevertheless, South Africa's growing ties with China and Russia have presented challenges for the United States, affecting its role in the country. Conclusion The competition between China and the United States has produced both positive and negative effects on South Africa's relations. The article outlines 18 impacts stemming from this rivalry, emphasizing the complexities of balancing these influences while pursuing national interests. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the U.S.-China rivalry has become a central aspect of international relations, with Africa emerging as a crucial battleground for influence. South Africa, significantly affected by this competition, serves as an important case study for analyzing the economic, cultural, and political impacts of Sino-American rivalry from 2010 to 2023. This research aims to provide a comprehensive understanding of South Africa’s policies while identifying opportunities for national development amid the competition. Additionally, it offers insights for South African policymakers on how to optimize benefits from this rivalry and informs Iran about leveraging its relationships with South Africa to enhance its influence in Africa and foster strategic cooperation. Introduction South Africa, as Africa’s second-largest economy and a major industrial hub, finds itself at the center of the economic and political rivalry between China and the United States. Both global powers seek to expand their influence through economic cooperation, albeit with differing priorities. China has concentrated its efforts on securing minerals, energy resources, and infrastructure development, while the United States emphasizes democracy, human rights, and trade relations. This dynamic competition significantly shapes South Africa’s economic growth and political trajectory, influencing its development strategies and global partnerships. Recognizing the profound implications of this rivalry, this study aims to explore its multifaceted dimensions and assess its broader impacts on South Africa’s economy and political landscape. The article’s theoretical framework is based on Robert Gilpin’s theory of hegemonic stability, which examines power dynamics within the international system, particularly in economic contexts. This theory suggests that global stability is maintained when a single hegemonic power dominates, but the rise of emerging powers, such as China and the United States, disrupts this equilibrium, leading to significant shifts in global power structures. In the context of South Africa, the competition between these two nations reflects their broader struggle for hegemonic influence in Southern Africa, with far-reaching consequences for both regional development and the global economic order. Additionally, the framework incorporates the concept of economic imperialism, highlighting how dominant nations extend their influence over weaker states through strategic investments and economic leverage. Together, these theoretical perspectives provide a lens for understanding the complex interplay of power, competition, and economic dominance shaping South Africa’s position in the global arena. The research method The study utilizes a comparative research method, a fundamental approach in social sciences for analyzing international relations and policies. By identifying similarities and differences, this method uncovers behavioral patterns and interactions between key actors. The research specifically examines the economic competition between China and the United States in South Africa through a case-based comparative lens, focusing on their investment strategies and the resulting impacts on the country’s economy and political landscape. Data is drawn from a variety of sources, including academic literature, international reports, and statistical analyses, to provide a comprehensive understanding of the broader consequences of this rivalry on South Africa’s development trajectory. Discussion The economic relations of both China and the United States with South Africa and other African nations are deeply shaped by the political, economic, and social histories of these regions. Since the Cold War, both powers have actively sought to expand their influence across Africa, though their approaches and strategies have diverged significantly. China has prioritized economic engagement through infrastructure development, resource extraction, and trade, often framed within initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative. In contrast, the United States has emphasized democracy promotion, human rights, and trade partnerships, aligning its efforts with broader geopolitical goals. These differing strategies reflect the unique historical contexts and priorities of each nation, while also highlighting the evolving dynamics of global power competition in Africa. China has emerged as one of South Africa’s largest trading partners, significantly expanding its economic relations since 2000. By 2023, the trade volume between the two nations reached $42 billion, marking a substantial increase over the years. South Africa’s exports to China grew from $8 billion in 2010 to $12 billion in 2023, while imports from China surged from $11 billion to $21 billion during the same period. This growing trade relationship underscores South Africa’s increasing reliance on Chinese goods and the deepening of commercial ties. China’s engagement in South Africa spans several key areas, including investment and infrastructure, where it has funded transportation and energy projects such as roads, bridges, and solar energy initiatives. In transportation and logistics, China has collaborated on developing ports and rail lines, including the Cape Town-Pretoria railway project. Additionally, China is a major exporter of goods to South Africa, supplying machinery, electronics, and construction materials, further solidifying its role in the country’s trade and industrial sectors. Conversely, the United States, as the world’s largest economy, has made significant investments in South Africa, particularly in technology, education, and healthcare. From 2010 to 2023, U.S. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in South Africa increased from $5.13 billion to $18.36 billion, indicating a steady upward trend. American tech giants like Google and Microsoft have been instrumental in advancing South Africa’s digital economy, with Microsoft notably establishing a $300 million cloud data center in the country. In the areas of education and healthcare, the U.S. has committed substantial resources, including over $7 billion for health programs focused on combating infectious diseases. These investments underscore the United States' dedication to fostering long-term development and capacity building in South Africa, contrasting with China’s emphasis on infrastructure and trade. Together, the economic activities of both nations reflect their strategic efforts to strengthen influence in South Africa, each utilizing distinct approaches to shape the country’s economic and social landscape. South Africa's exports to the United States have experienced notable fluctuations from 2010 to 2023, rising from $7.15 billion in 2010 to $8.43 billion in 2023. In parallel, imports from the U.S. have also fluctuated due to varying economic conditions and changes in trade policies. In contrast, China, one of South Africa's largest trading partners, achieved a trade volume of $42 billion in 2023. China remains a key exporter of goods to South Africa, supplying a diverse range of products, including machinery, electronics, and construction materials. The political impact of China on South Africa is primarily evident through the expansion of economic and diplomatic relations. By establishing infrastructure projects and increasing investments in the country, China aims to enhance its influence across Africa. The close ties between the two nations, highlighted by their participation in organizations such as BRICS and G77, reflect China's commitment to bolstering South Africa's economic and political standing. These connections position China as a strategic partner and a crucial source of funding for the development of South African infrastructure. As a global power, the United States has sought to maintain its influence in South Africa, though recent years have posed challenges. During the Obama administration, relations were strengthened, reflecting his African roots. However, subsequent political changes in the U.S. have negatively impacted these relations. The U.S. has worked to protect its interests in South Africa by providing economic aid and development programs. Nevertheless, South Africa's growing ties with China and Russia have presented challenges for the United States, affecting its role in the country. Conclusion The competition between China and the United States has produced both positive and negative effects on South Africa's relations. The article outlines 18 impacts stemming from this rivalry, emphasizing the complexities of balancing these influences while pursuing national interests. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the U.S.-China rivalry has become a central aspect of international relations, with Africa emerging as a crucial battleground for influence. South Africa, significantly affected by this competition, serves as an important case study for analyzing the economic, cultural, and political impacts of Sino-American rivalry from 2010 to 2023. This research aims to provide a comprehensive understanding of South Africa’s policies while identifying opportunities for national development amid the competition. Additionally, it offers insights for South African policymakers on how to optimize benefits from this rivalry and informs Iran about leveraging its relationships with South Africa to enhance its influence in Africa and foster strategic cooperation.

https://jpq.ut.ac.ir/article_101108_646cd2469d92fcf197d220af3deaef0a.pdf

University of Tehran POLITICAL QUARTERLY 1735-9678 55 1 2025 04 05 The Epistemological Foundations of John Locke's Theory of Social Contract The Epistemological Foundations of John Locke's Theory of Social Contract 213 189 101112 10.22059/jpq.2025.309186.1007655 FA َAli Ali Hoseini Associated Professor, Faculty of Administrative sciences and Economics, University of Isfahan, Iran. Abdollah Binandeh PhD in Political Science, Faculty of Administrative sciences and Economics, University of Isfahan, Iran. Journal Article 2020 09 01 Introduction John Locke (1632–1704) is a pivotal figure in political philosophy, whose ideas have profoundly influenced foundational debates on governance and society. Despite extensive discourse surrounding his theories, the epistemological underpinnings of Locke's thought often remain underexplored. These principles, central to his philosophy, are articulated primarily in his seminal work, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. While a comprehensive examination of the interrelation between Locke’s epistemology and political thought exceeds the scope of this paper, this study aims to investigate the epistemological foundations of his social contract theory. The primary assertion is that Locke’s social contract theory, as the cornerstone of his political philosophy, is inextricably linked to his epistemological framework. To fully understand Locke’s political philosophy, particularly his articulation of the social contract, one must engage deeply with his epistemological premises. The Research Method This study employs a descriptive-analytical approach to examine Locke’s epistemological framework in relation to his social contract theory. The analysis is structured around three core epistemological constructs: the tools of knowledge, the types of knowledge, and the possibility of knowledge. These constructs serve as a heuristic framework for interpreting Locke’s philosophical principles. Each construct is analyzed to clarify Locke’s position, followed by an exploration of their implications for the social contract. By tracing these interconnections, this study aims to delineate how Locke’s epistemological commitments inform and underpin his political theorizing. Results and Discussion Locke begins his inquiry by examining the origin of ideas, asserting that all ideas arise from experience and systematically refuting the concept of innate ideas. He defines knowledge as the agreement or disagreement among ideas, thereby clarifying its nature, scope, and limitations. Locke identifies three primary tools for acquiring knowledge: reason, revelation, and sensory perception, with reason occupying the apex of this hierarchy as the ultimate criterion for evaluating truth claims. He classifies knowledge into three categories: intuitive, demonstrative, and sensory, assigning certainty to the first two while acknowledging the probabilistic nature of sensory knowledge. Although he recognizes the limited scope of certain knowledge, Locke emphasizes the pragmatic importance of probabilistic knowledge, which he argues governs most human endeavors. His epistemological perspective, described as indirect realism, affirms the possibility of attaining certain knowledge within specific constraints. The central question arises: How does Locke’s social contract theory relate to his epistemological framework? This inquiry requires examining how these epistemological principles shape and manifest within the theory itself. Locke’s philosophical approach suggests that political and societal concepts, like those in other domains, originate from experience and adhere to similar epistemological rules. However, his account does not explicitly clarify which type of experience gives rise to these concepts or the specific mechanisms by which they are derived. In Locke’s depiction of the state of nature, human beings are rational agents whose capacity for reason enables peaceful coexistence. This rationalist portrayal is crucial for his social contract theory, as a depiction of the state of nature as brutish and anarchic would contradict Locke’s vision. The assumption of human rationality serves as a necessary precondition for the theory, motivating individuals to form a contract that establishes society and governance. Locke’s rationalist interpretation of the state of nature emphasizes reason as the dominant epistemological element, driving individuals to seek an escape from this condition. The absence of a final arbiter or governing authority in the state of nature makes it precarious and prone to conflict, compelling rational individuals to consent to a social contract that establishes governance based on mutual agreement. For Locke, reason serves as the epistemological foundation of both the social contract and the subsequent formation of government. Political society emerges solely through a consensual social contract rooted in the rationality of individuals in the state of nature. This collective rationality not only facilitates the establishment of government but also underpins the creation of laws after its formation. Consequently, Locke strongly rejects absolutist governance as antithetical to rational principles. While Locke’s political arguments primarily rely on rationalist and demonstrative reasoning, he also invokes scriptural authority (what he terms “revealed revelation”) to critique opposing theories such as divine-right monarchy and to align his ideas with the Protestant ethos of 17th-century England. Nevertheless, the core of Locke’s political philosophy is firmly anchored in rationalist principles, which portray power, governance, and law as secular constructs derived from collective human reason rather than divine ordination. Locke’s emphasis on the epistemological primacy of reason underscores his argument for social contract theory. Reason, as the principal tool of knowledge, clarifies both the state of nature and the necessity of forming a contract to establish governance. Additionally, reason, in conjunction with revealed revelation, forms the epistemological basis for Locke’s critique of Robert Filmer’s patriarchal theory. Following the establishment of government, laws become essential for maintaining social order. Locke limits the authority of religious doctrine while expanding the jurisdiction of human reason, entrusting the creation of laws to the collective rationality of society—a faculty capable of discerning natural law and rights and framing laws for human coexistence. Conclusion This study has aimed to clarify Locke’s epistemological foundations and their relationship with his social contract theory. As a pioneer of empiricism, Locke asserts that all human ideas originate from experience, systematically rejecting the theory of innate ideas. He explores the nature, limitations, and instruments of knowledge, categorizing it into intuitive, demonstrative, and sensory types. Ultimately, Locke’s adherence to the representational theory of knowledge positions him as an epistemological realist who affirms the possibility of certain knowledge. The concept of the social contract emerges as a composite construct with empirical origins, situated within Locke’s classification of relational knowledge. While Locke aligns the theory with demonstrative reasoning, he acknowledges its reliance on probabilistic certainty rather than mathematical precision. The theory is grounded in reason and supplemented by scriptural affirmations that reflect Locke’s socio-political context. His epistemological realism, a unique synthesis of empiricism and rationalism, along with his commitment to probabilistic knowledge, profoundly shapes the contours of his social contract theory. Locke's discussions on the state of nature and the formation of the social contract are firmly rooted in his epistemological realism and rationalist commitment. Introduction John Locke (1632–1704) is a pivotal figure in political philosophy, whose ideas have profoundly influenced foundational debates on governance and society. Despite extensive discourse surrounding his theories, the epistemological underpinnings of Locke's thought often remain underexplored. These principles, central to his philosophy, are articulated primarily in his seminal work, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. While a comprehensive examination of the interrelation between Locke’s epistemology and political thought exceeds the scope of this paper, this study aims to investigate the epistemological foundations of his social contract theory. The primary assertion is that Locke’s social contract theory, as the cornerstone of his political philosophy, is inextricably linked to his epistemological framework. To fully understand Locke’s political philosophy, particularly his articulation of the social contract, one must engage deeply with his epistemological premises. The Research Method This study employs a descriptive-analytical approach to examine Locke’s epistemological framework in relation to his social contract theory. The analysis is structured around three core epistemological constructs: the tools of knowledge, the types of knowledge, and the possibility of knowledge. These constructs serve as a heuristic framework for interpreting Locke’s philosophical principles. Each construct is analyzed to clarify Locke’s position, followed by an exploration of their implications for the social contract. By tracing these interconnections, this study aims to delineate how Locke’s epistemological commitments inform and underpin his political theorizing. Results and Discussion Locke begins his inquiry by examining the origin of ideas, asserting that all ideas arise from experience and systematically refuting the concept of innate ideas. He defines knowledge as the agreement or disagreement among ideas, thereby clarifying its nature, scope, and limitations. Locke identifies three primary tools for acquiring knowledge: reason, revelation, and sensory perception, with reason occupying the apex of this hierarchy as the ultimate criterion for evaluating truth claims. He classifies knowledge into three categories: intuitive, demonstrative, and sensory, assigning certainty to the first two while acknowledging the probabilistic nature of sensory knowledge. Although he recognizes the limited scope of certain knowledge, Locke emphasizes the pragmatic importance of probabilistic knowledge, which he argues governs most human endeavors. His epistemological perspective, described as indirect realism, affirms the possibility of attaining certain knowledge within specific constraints. The central question arises: How does Locke’s social contract theory relate to his epistemological framework? This inquiry requires examining how these epistemological principles shape and manifest within the theory itself. Locke’s philosophical approach suggests that political and societal concepts, like those in other domains, originate from experience and adhere to similar epistemological rules. However, his account does not explicitly clarify which type of experience gives rise to these concepts or the specific mechanisms by which they are derived. In Locke’s depiction of the state of nature, human beings are rational agents whose capacity for reason enables peaceful coexistence. This rationalist portrayal is crucial for his social contract theory, as a depiction of the state of nature as brutish and anarchic would contradict Locke’s vision. The assumption of human rationality serves as a necessary precondition for the theory, motivating individuals to form a contract that establishes society and governance. Locke’s rationalist interpretation of the state of nature emphasizes reason as the dominant epistemological element, driving individuals to seek an escape from this condition. The absence of a final arbiter or governing authority in the state of nature makes it precarious and prone to conflict, compelling rational individuals to consent to a social contract that establishes governance based on mutual agreement. For Locke, reason serves as the epistemological foundation of both the social contract and the subsequent formation of government. Political society emerges solely through a consensual social contract rooted in the rationality of individuals in the state of nature. This collective rationality not only facilitates the establishment of government but also underpins the creation of laws after its formation. Consequently, Locke strongly rejects absolutist governance as antithetical to rational principles. While Locke’s political arguments primarily rely on rationalist and demonstrative reasoning, he also invokes scriptural authority (what he terms “revealed revelation”) to critique opposing theories such as divine-right monarchy and to align his ideas with the Protestant ethos of 17th-century England. Nevertheless, the core of Locke’s political philosophy is firmly anchored in rationalist principles, which portray power, governance, and law as secular constructs derived from collective human reason rather than divine ordination. Locke’s emphasis on the epistemological primacy of reason underscores his argument for social contract theory. Reason, as the principal tool of knowledge, clarifies both the state of nature and the necessity of forming a contract to establish governance. Additionally, reason, in conjunction with revealed revelation, forms the epistemological basis for Locke’s critique of Robert Filmer’s patriarchal theory. Following the establishment of government, laws become essential for maintaining social order. Locke limits the authority of religious doctrine while expanding the jurisdiction of human reason, entrusting the creation of laws to the collective rationality of society—a faculty capable of discerning natural law and rights and framing laws for human coexistence. Conclusion This study has aimed to clarify Locke’s epistemological foundations and their relationship with his social contract theory. As a pioneer of empiricism, Locke asserts that all human ideas originate from experience, systematically rejecting the theory of innate ideas. He explores the nature, limitations, and instruments of knowledge, categorizing it into intuitive, demonstrative, and sensory types. Ultimately, Locke’s adherence to the representational theory of knowledge positions him as an epistemological realist who affirms the possibility of certain knowledge. The concept of the social contract emerges as a composite construct with empirical origins, situated within Locke’s classification of relational knowledge. While Locke aligns the theory with demonstrative reasoning, he acknowledges its reliance on probabilistic certainty rather than mathematical precision. The theory is grounded in reason and supplemented by scriptural affirmations that reflect Locke’s socio-political context. His epistemological realism, a unique synthesis of empiricism and rationalism, along with his commitment to probabilistic knowledge, profoundly shapes the contours of his social contract theory. Locke's discussions on the state of nature and the formation of the social contract are firmly rooted in his epistemological realism and rationalist commitment.

https://jpq.ut.ac.ir/article_101112_500ed980e8e2cbf4106776799d5c1d4b.pdf

University of Tehran POLITICAL QUARTERLY 1735-9678 55 1 2025 04 05 Hydro-political Security Complex Impact on Water Interaction Mechanisms in the Jordan Basin Hydro-political Security Complex Impact on Water Interaction Mechanisms in the Jordan Basin 243 215 101113 10.22059/jpq.2025.384143.1008229 FA Masouma Qanbari PhD Student in International Relations, Tarbiat Modares University, Tehran, Iran. Vali Golmohammadi Assistant Professor, Department of International Relations. Tarbiat Modares University, Faculty of Humanities, Tehran, Iran. Seyed-Masoud Mousavi-Shafaee Assosiated Professor, Department of International Relations. Tarbiat Modares University, Tehran, Iran. Journal Article 2024 09 24 Introduction The Jordan Basin is recognized as one of the most complex security-hydropolitical Security Complexes the world. In addition to historical political tensions among riparian countries, it faces challenges of rapid population growth and increasing water scarcity. The paper addresses the complex challenge of transboundary water management in the Jordan River Basin, where water scarcity intersects with geopolitical tensions. It emphasizes how post-Cold War changes in international power structures created new opportunities for water cooperation while maintaining historical tensions. Methodology This study utilizes qualitative methods and analysis of credible documents to examine vertical and horizontal relationships in the basin. The theoretical framework is based on the concept of security-hydropolitical complex, which extends the regional security complex theory with a specific focus on water resources, access, and the connection between water and the security of riparian states. This framework investigates the impacts of structural levels on water interactions, geopolitical dynamics of the basin, and the interrelation between water issues, security, and climate change. Theoretical Framework Building upon Buzan's concept of Regional Security Complex, Michael Schulz introduced the "Hydropolitical Security Complex" to describe the intricate relationships between states regarding shared water resource management. This concept demonstrates how water scarcity, access, and control have profound implications for state security. Schulz identified three pillars: hydrological interdependence, political interdependence, and security interdependence, analyzable through vertical and horizontal relationships where power dynamics play a crucial role. Results and Discussion Vertical Relations: The post-Cold War transformation significantly impacted the Jordan River Basin's vertical relations. Lebanon experienced political instability and Hezbollah's growing influence, affecting its water management capabilities. Syria's position weakened after losing Soviet support, leading to engagement in peace negotiations while maintaining water-related tensions with Israel. Jordan strategically aligned with Western powers, facilitating water cooperation agreements. Israel maintained military superiority while engaging in selective cooperation, particularly with Jordan. Palestinian water rights remained constrained by power asymmetry despite recognition in the Oslo Accords. Horizontal Relations: The analysis of horizontal relations reveals complex patterns of cooperation and conflict in water management after the Cold War. The Madrid Conference initiated multilateral water negotiations, leading to the Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty (1994) with significant water provisions. The Oslo II Agreement established the Joint Water Committee for the West Bank, though power asymmetry limited its effectiveness. Lebanon's Hasbani-Wazzani projects faced strong Israeli opposition, demonstrating continued water securitization. The Red Sea-Dead Sea Water Conveyance Project and the Water-Energy Agreement (2021) exemplify limited cooperation possibilities despite political tensions. Power Dynamics Impact:The analysis reveals that power dynamics have influenced water relations in the Jordan River Basin through four interconnected mechanisms: water resource distribution and control, shaping countries' water policies, determining international cooperation levels, and joint management capabilities. These mechanisms operate within a complex geopolitical environment where military capabilities, technological advancement, and international support play crucial roles. Water resource distribution and control has been predominantly shaped by Israel's strategic advantage, particularly after the 1967 war, extending to technological superiority in water management. The shaping of water policies reflects regional power dynamics, with Jordan seeking cooperative solutions due to its dependence on transboundary waters, while Israel maintains selective cooperation while pursuing independent water policies. International cooperation levels have been influenced by geopolitical alignments and security concerns, with the Oslo Peace Process creating opportunities for water cooperation, though limited by trust deficits. Joint management capabilities reveal how power asymmetries affect institutional arrangements, with some bilateral arrangements succeeding while basin-wide management remains challenging. These mechanisms have produced two distinct patterns: a conflict pattern characterized by direct security threats and power asymmetries, particularly evident in the Israel-Lebanon border region and occupied territories; and a limited cooperation pattern based on mutual interests and shared environmental concerns, exemplified by Israel-Jordan relations. The interaction between these mechanisms and patterns has created a complex hydropolitical landscape where water issues are inextricably linked to broader security and political concerns. Conclusion The analysis reveals that post-Cold War structural changes profoundly affected power dynamics and relationship patterns in the Jordan River Basin. The weakening of Soviet influence and increased U.S. involvement facilitated peace negotiations and water discussions. However, asymmetric water control and regional conflicts continue to challenge comprehensive cooperation. Climate change and population growth further complicate existing dynamics. The findings confirm that the four identified mechanisms operate within a complex system where changes in one component affect the entire system, highlighting the intricate relationship between water management and regional geopolitics. Introduction The Jordan Basin is recognized as one of the most complex security-hydropolitical Security Complexes the world. In addition to historical political tensions among riparian countries, it faces challenges of rapid population growth and increasing water scarcity. The paper addresses the complex challenge of transboundary water management in the Jordan River Basin, where water scarcity intersects with geopolitical tensions. It emphasizes how post-Cold War changes in international power structures created new opportunities for water cooperation while maintaining historical tensions. Methodology This study utilizes qualitative methods and analysis of credible documents to examine vertical and horizontal relationships in the basin. The theoretical framework is based on the concept of security-hydropolitical complex, which extends the regional security complex theory with a specific focus on water resources, access, and the connection between water and the security of riparian states. This framework investigates the impacts of structural levels on water interactions, geopolitical dynamics of the basin, and the interrelation between water issues, security, and climate change. Theoretical Framework Building upon Buzan's concept of Regional Security Complex, Michael Schulz introduced the "Hydropolitical Security Complex" to describe the intricate relationships between states regarding shared water resource management. This concept demonstrates how water scarcity, access, and control have profound implications for state security. Schulz identified three pillars: hydrological interdependence, political interdependence, and security interdependence, analyzable through vertical and horizontal relationships where power dynamics play a crucial role. Results and Discussion Vertical Relations: The post-Cold War transformation significantly impacted the Jordan River Basin's vertical relations. Lebanon experienced political instability and Hezbollah's growing influence, affecting its water management capabilities. Syria's position weakened after losing Soviet support, leading to engagement in peace negotiations while maintaining water-related tensions with Israel. Jordan strategically aligned with Western powers, facilitating water cooperation agreements. Israel maintained military superiority while engaging in selective cooperation, particularly with Jordan. Palestinian water rights remained constrained by power asymmetry despite recognition in the Oslo Accords. Horizontal Relations: The analysis of horizontal relations reveals complex patterns of cooperation and conflict in water management after the Cold War. The Madrid Conference initiated multilateral water negotiations, leading to the Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty (1994) with significant water provisions. The Oslo II Agreement established the Joint Water Committee for the West Bank, though power asymmetry limited its effectiveness. Lebanon's Hasbani-Wazzani projects faced strong Israeli opposition, demonstrating continued water securitization. The Red Sea-Dead Sea Water Conveyance Project and the Water-Energy Agreement (2021) exemplify limited cooperation possibilities despite political tensions. Power Dynamics Impact:The analysis reveals that power dynamics have influenced water relations in the Jordan River Basin through four interconnected mechanisms: water resource distribution and control, shaping countries' water policies, determining international cooperation levels, and joint management capabilities. These mechanisms operate within a complex geopolitical environment where military capabilities, technological advancement, and international support play crucial roles. Water resource distribution and control has been predominantly shaped by Israel's strategic advantage, particularly after the 1967 war, extending to technological superiority in water management. The shaping of water policies reflects regional power dynamics, with Jordan seeking cooperative solutions due to its dependence on transboundary waters, while Israel maintains selective cooperation while pursuing independent water policies. International cooperation levels have been influenced by geopolitical alignments and security concerns, with the Oslo Peace Process creating opportunities for water cooperation, though limited by trust deficits. Joint management capabilities reveal how power asymmetries affect institutional arrangements, with some bilateral arrangements succeeding while basin-wide management remains challenging. These mechanisms have produced two distinct patterns: a conflict pattern characterized by direct security threats and power asymmetries, particularly evident in the Israel-Lebanon border region and occupied territories; and a limited cooperation pattern based on mutual interests and shared environmental concerns, exemplified by Israel-Jordan relations. The interaction between these mechanisms and patterns has created a complex hydropolitical landscape where water issues are inextricably linked to broader security and political concerns. Conclusion The analysis reveals that post-Cold War structural changes profoundly affected power dynamics and relationship patterns in the Jordan River Basin. The weakening of Soviet influence and increased U.S. involvement facilitated peace negotiations and water discussions. However, asymmetric water control and regional conflicts continue to challenge comprehensive cooperation. Climate change and population growth further complicate existing dynamics. The findings confirm that the four identified mechanisms operate within a complex system where changes in one component affect the entire system, highlighting the intricate relationship between water management and regional geopolitics.

https://jpq.ut.ac.ir/article_101113_3f1a4bbe885673f7fe84720c3aee7ff3.pdf

University of Tehran POLITICAL QUARTERLY 1735-9678 55 1 2025 04 05 New Media and Cognitive Agency: Exploring the Impact of Artificial Intelligence on Political and Social Agency New Media and Cognitive Agency: Exploring the Impact of Artificial Intelligence on Political and Social Agency 273 245 101114 10.22059/jpq.2025.382279.1008210 FA Razieh Mehrabi Koushki Assistant Professor, Faculty member of the Department of International Studies in Science and Technology, Technology Studies Institute, Tehran, Iran. Journal Article 2024 09 12 Introduction Knowledge serves as the foundation of culture, history, and a wide range of human actions, including the formation of moral judgments, choices, and decisions in both individual and social life. In a democratic system, the fundamental assumption is that citizens participate in civil and political affairs based on this knowledge, and democratic institutions are tasked with facilitating the natural realization of collective consciousness and will in societal and political spheres. However, rapid technological advancements, particularly in artificial intelligence (AI), have introduced an intelligent yet non-human agent that profoundly impacts various aspects of human life, including how individuals understand and interpret the world around them. AI is unique in its ability to mimic and perform functions of human intelligence, such as reasoning, problem-solving, discovering meaning, generalizing, learning from past experiences, and making targeted decisions by identifying hidden patterns, rules, and relationships within data. It can also anticipate future trends, making it a powerful tool for influencing human behavior. With its integration into modern social media platforms, AI has disrupted democratic systems by enabling the production and dissemination of false, fake, and biased information. The presence of AI-driven technologies in social media has intensified a critical issue: the political and civic fate of societies is increasingly determined by the will and algorithms of artificial intelligence rather than the deliberate thought and will of individuals. This undermines the democratic ideal, which relies on the public's calculated and reasoned judgment, not their impulsive or manipulated reactions. Today, the adverse effects of artificial intelligence (AI) on public goods—such as justice, social equality, human rights, freedom of expression, and, more broadly, democracy and civil engagement—have emerged as pressing challenges for experts and sociologists to understand and address. These issues highlight the growing influence of AI in shaping societal structures and individual behaviors. This research focuses on a central question: How does a technological factor like AI, operating within the context of social networks, influence people's political and social awareness and, ultimately, determine their behavior? In other words, how do intelligent algorithms shape socio-political beliefs, justify certain choices and decisions, and invalidate others? By addressing this question, the study aims to uncover how AI technology, embedded in social media platforms, undermines human "agency" in receiving, evaluating, and interpreting information. Over time, AI itself becomes the dominant agency, steering public opinion and decision-making processes. Methodology To address the above question, this research adopts a qualitative approach, collecting and analyzing data from a range of sources. Using the library and documentary method, the study compiles the latest theoretical and experimental findings from the past eight years. Through content analysis, it identifies and evaluates the most significant cognitive effects of artificial intelligence on political-social agency, supported by available evidence. Finally, the research offers practical suggestions and solutions aimed at restoring human agency in political and social life, thereby contributing to the reinvigoration of democratic order. Results and Discussion Artificial intelligence serves as a powerful tool for both malicious government agencies and foreign actors seeking to infiltrate and disrupt. It targets political-social agency on social media through various strategies, undermining individuals' independence in decision-making and taking control of their rational, internal, and measured processes of activism. Below, we discuss the most significant strategies identified in this study: Gradual Cognitive Damage: Smart technologies in the digital space function like a "digital Pavlov," conditioning human behavior and agency through free, diverse, and highly engaging services. This process rapidly captures users' attention, shapes their worldview, and earns their trust. Prolonged exposure to these platforms can make individuals more compliant, susceptible to external persuasion, and prone to uncritical acceptance of information. Cognitive Hacking Through Micro-Profiling: AI algorithms collect personal data by identifying emotional vulnerabilities, fears, political preferences, and social interests. Using this information, they tailor and deliver political messages aligned with individuals' personality types. This enables AI to target undecided or swing voters, producing and disseminating specific information to sway their decisions in favor of a particular political agenda. Epistemic Bubbles: Artificial intelligence categorizes users into homogeneous groups through homogenizing algorithms, delivering information that aligns with their existing intellectual and value frameworks. While this may seem like personalized content, it effectively censors or restricts access to diverse perspectives. Users become trapped in "filter bubbles" or information caves, where they only encounter echoes of their own beliefs and approved thoughts, limiting exposure to alternative viewpoints. Erosion of Individual Knowledge and Trust: AI can undermine trust in an individual's cognitive capacities, gradually eroding their reasoning and critical thinking skills. Over-reliance on AI-driven information can lead individuals to forget that agency lies in their own knowledge and awareness, with technology serving merely as a tool for efficiency rather than a replacement for independent thought. Amplification of Emotional Knowledge: Exposure to a high volume of false, hateful, or fake news and information can lead to the overflow of emotional behaviors into offline actions, fostering external conflicts. In this environment, knowledge becomes intertwined with exaggerated emotions, undermining critical rationality and progressive politics, which are essential for a well-informed and balanced society. Creation of False Epistemic Consensus and Minority Dominance: Certain AI mechanisms, such as astroturfing, create platforms where fringe views are amplified to appear mainstream, dictating values and choices to the majority. This distorts the worldview that serves the interests of most people, pushing it into the background or dismantling it entirely. The result is a disoriented society led by unstable and superficially competent individuals. This cognitive disorder is further exacerbated by social and political bots, as well as false campaigns, which manipulate public perception and decision-making. Creating Epistemic Distance from Socio-Political Reality: Epistemic distance arises when information technologies create a gap between reality and cognitive agency. In this process, data passes through multiple intermediaries before reaching individuals, creating a space uniquely suited for constructing and maintaining a fabricated world. AI exacerbates this issue by continuously producing and republishing false content, such as deepfake videos, targeting rival political groups. The situation becomes particularly dire when AI-generated content is so close to the truth that distinguishing it from reality becomes nearly impossible. This blurring of lines between fact and fiction further erodes trust in information and undermines the ability of individuals to engage meaningfully with socio-political realities. Conclusion New media technologies, with their complex technical mechanisms, possess the ability to control and direct people's will and choices, shaping their understanding and knowledge of social and political realities—often without their awareness. This study observed that artificial intelligence manipulates human agency through political bots, echo chambers, deepfakes, and targeted misinformation, effectively controlling individuals' thinking, reasoning, and decision-making in political matters using various strategies. To address these challenges, the most critical and effective solution is to strengthen human agency by fostering analytical and critical thinking skills. Equipping individuals with the ability to discern and evaluate information independently can mitigate the influence of AI-driven manipulation. Introduction Knowledge serves as the foundation of culture, history, and a wide range of human actions, including the formation of moral judgments, choices, and decisions in both individual and social life. In a democratic system, the fundamental assumption is that citizens participate in civil and political affairs based on this knowledge, and democratic institutions are tasked with facilitating the natural realization of collective consciousness and will in societal and political spheres. However, rapid technological advancements, particularly in artificial intelligence (AI), have introduced an intelligent yet non-human agent that profoundly impacts various aspects of human life, including how individuals understand and interpret the world around them. AI is unique in its ability to mimic and perform functions of human intelligence, such as reasoning, problem-solving, discovering meaning, generalizing, learning from past experiences, and making targeted decisions by identifying hidden patterns, rules, and relationships within data. It can also anticipate future trends, making it a powerful tool for influencing human behavior. With its integration into modern social media platforms, AI has disrupted democratic systems by enabling the production and dissemination of false, fake, and biased information. The presence of AI-driven technologies in social media has intensified a critical issue: the political and civic fate of societies is increasingly determined by the will and algorithms of artificial intelligence rather than the deliberate thought and will of individuals. This undermines the democratic ideal, which relies on the public's calculated and reasoned judgment, not their impulsive or manipulated reactions. Today, the adverse effects of artificial intelligence (AI) on public goods—such as justice, social equality, human rights, freedom of expression, and, more broadly, democracy and civil engagement—have emerged as pressing challenges for experts and sociologists to understand and address. These issues highlight the growing influence of AI in shaping societal structures and individual behaviors. This research focuses on a central question: How does a technological factor like AI, operating within the context of social networks, influence people's political and social awareness and, ultimately, determine their behavior? In other words, how do intelligent algorithms shape socio-political beliefs, justify certain choices and decisions, and invalidate others? By addressing this question, the study aims to uncover how AI technology, embedded in social media platforms, undermines human "agency" in receiving, evaluating, and interpreting information. Over time, AI itself becomes the dominant agency, steering public opinion and decision-making processes. Methodology To address the above question, this research adopts a qualitative approach, collecting and analyzing data from a range of sources. Using the library and documentary method, the study compiles the latest theoretical and experimental findings from the past eight years. Through content analysis, it identifies and evaluates the most significant cognitive effects of artificial intelligence on political-social agency, supported by available evidence. Finally, the research offers practical suggestions and solutions aimed at restoring human agency in political and social life, thereby contributing to the reinvigoration of democratic order. Results and Discussion Artificial intelligence serves as a powerful tool for both malicious government agencies and foreign actors seeking to infiltrate and disrupt. It targets political-social agency on social media through various strategies, undermining individuals' independence in decision-making and taking control of their rational, internal, and measured processes of activism. Below, we discuss the most significant strategies identified in this study: Gradual Cognitive Damage: Smart technologies in the digital space function like a "digital Pavlov," conditioning human behavior and agency through free, diverse, and highly engaging services. This process rapidly captures users' attention, shapes their worldview, and earns their trust. Prolonged exposure to these platforms can make individuals more compliant, susceptible to external persuasion, and prone to uncritical acceptance of information. Cognitive Hacking Through Micro-Profiling: AI algorithms collect personal data by identifying emotional vulnerabilities, fears, political preferences, and social interests. Using this information, they tailor and deliver political messages aligned with individuals' personality types. This enables AI to target undecided or swing voters, producing and disseminating specific information to sway their decisions in favor of a particular political agenda. Epistemic Bubbles: Artificial intelligence categorizes users into homogeneous groups through homogenizing algorithms, delivering information that aligns with their existing intellectual and value frameworks. While this may seem like personalized content, it effectively censors or restricts access to diverse perspectives. Users become trapped in "filter bubbles" or information caves, where they only encounter echoes of their own beliefs and approved thoughts, limiting exposure to alternative viewpoints. Erosion of Individual Knowledge and Trust: AI can undermine trust in an individual's cognitive capacities, gradually eroding their reasoning and critical thinking skills. Over-reliance on AI-driven information can lead individuals to forget that agency lies in their own knowledge and awareness, with technology serving merely as a tool for efficiency rather than a replacement for independent thought. Amplification of Emotional Knowledge: Exposure to a high volume of false, hateful, or fake news and information can lead to the overflow of emotional behaviors into offline actions, fostering external conflicts. In this environment, knowledge becomes intertwined with exaggerated emotions, undermining critical rationality and progressive politics, which are essential for a well-informed and balanced society. Creation of False Epistemic Consensus and Minority Dominance: Certain AI mechanisms, such as astroturfing, create platforms where fringe views are amplified to appear mainstream, dictating values and choices to the majority. This distorts the worldview that serves the interests of most people, pushing it into the background or dismantling it entirely. The result is a disoriented society led by unstable and superficially competent individuals. This cognitive disorder is further exacerbated by social and political bots, as well as false campaigns, which manipulate public perception and decision-making. Creating Epistemic Distance from Socio-Political Reality: Epistemic distance arises when information technologies create a gap between reality and cognitive agency. In this process, data passes through multiple intermediaries before reaching individuals, creating a space uniquely suited for constructing and maintaining a fabricated world. AI exacerbates this issue by continuously producing and republishing false content, such as deepfake videos, targeting rival political groups. The situation becomes particularly dire when AI-generated content is so close to the truth that distinguishing it from reality becomes nearly impossible. This blurring of lines between fact and fiction further erodes trust in information and undermines the ability of individuals to engage meaningfully with socio-political realities. Conclusion New media technologies, with their complex technical mechanisms, possess the ability to control and direct people's will and choices, shaping their understanding and knowledge of social and political realities—often without their awareness. This study observed that artificial intelligence manipulates human agency through political bots, echo chambers, deepfakes, and targeted misinformation, effectively controlling individuals' thinking, reasoning, and decision-making in political matters using various strategies. To address these challenges, the most critical and effective solution is to strengthen human agency by fostering analytical and critical thinking skills. Equipping individuals with the ability to discern and evaluate information independently can mitigate the influence of AI-driven manipulation.

https://jpq.ut.ac.ir/article_101114_3a1728f9b7514c44f55bd84b70d88e6c.pdf

University of Tehran POLITICAL QUARTERLY 1735-9678 55 1 2025 04 05 The Impact of the Belt and Road Initiative on the Economic Integration of the European Union (2010-2022) The Impact of the Belt and Road Initiative on the Economic Integration of the European Union (2010-2022) 307 275 101115 10.22059/jpq.2025.383419.1008223 FA Roxana Niknami Assistant Professor, Department of Regional Studies, Faculty of Law and Political Sciences, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran. Roohollah Ghandhari 2 Ph.D. Candidate, Department of Law and International Relations, Tehran University International Campus, Kish, Iran. 0009-0003-7309-3527 Journal Article 2024 10 08 Introduction In 1996, China launched a long-term modernization plan aimed at promoting the economic development of its western regions, aligned with the Go West campaign and the Made in China 2025 initiative. These strategies were designed to elevate China's global standing in high-tech industries, while the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), introduced in 2013 by President Xi Jinping, sought to establish transit corridors for goods and services across Asia, Africa, and Europe. Together with China's peaceful rise strategy, these initiatives aim to position China among the world's top powers by 2025. A critical component in implementing the BRI is the 14+1 Agreement, a framework for cooperation between China and several Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC). Originally proposed as the 16+1 in 2011, it became the 17+1 in 2018 with Greece's inclusion, and was later reduced to 14+1 following Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia exit in 2021 and 2022, respectively. The primary objective of this Agreement is to enhance regional cooperation and facilitate significant Chinese investments in the industries and infrastructure of CEEC. Under this framework, China has committed to undertake infrastructure projects, such as upgrading and developing ports, communication networks, bridges, and railway lines. According to what was mentioned, the main goal of this research is to answer the following question: “how the Belt and Road Initiative has affected the economic integration of the European Union”. In response, the research hypothesis is proposed as follows: “In alignment with the People's Republic of China’s ‘Go West’ campaign, the implementation of the 14+1 Agreement has led to an increase in foreign trade and a rise in the rate of Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) in the region. This, in turn, has contributed to economic divergence within the European Union.” Method In this research, the hypothesis was comprehensively explored by integrating Cantori and Spiegel's theoretical framework with Policy Analysis and Econometric Modelling. The study focuses on the timeframe from 2010 to 2023, providing a robust temporal scope for analysis. Results According to the defined indicators, foreign trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) statistics between the European Union, China, and the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC) were reviewed for the period of 2010–2022 (up to 2021 for FDI). The results of these reviews and comparisons reveal that CEEC maintained the highest rate of trade with the European Union and their neighboring states, reflecting complementary economies in the region and favorable conditions for regional convergence. A notable outcome of the Belt and Road Initiative and the 14+1 Agreement is the significant increase in trade between China and CEEC. Based on the data in Table 3, and after calculating the growth rate of foreign trade between China, the European Union, and these countries, the necessary information and statistics were obtained to plot Charts 2 and 3. The statistical data from these tables and graphs can be summarized as follows:  EU Foreign Trade with CEEC: Chart 2 illustrates that the EU's imports and exports with Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries have experienced consistent, exponential growth overall. Table 4 shows a 5.8% growth in EU imports from CEE countries and a 5.4% growth in exports to these countries. Additionally, Table 4 identifies four points of disruption in EU-CEE trade relations, which are clearly marked in Chart 2. Overall, trade between the EU and CEE countries grew by 5.6%, reflecting steady and robust economic ties.  China’s Foreign Trade with CEEC: Analysis of Table 3 reveals an 8.5% increase in China’s imports from CEE countries and a 9.2% increase in exports from China to these countries. Chart 3 confirms this growth trend, showing disruptions only at three points: 2012, 2015, and 2022. China’s trade with CEE countries has grown at a higher rate than the EU's, achieving a 9.03% increase from 2010 to 2022, which suggests deepening economic ties. A comparison of Charts 2 and 3 highlights that while the EU's trade volume remains higher, China’s rapid growth rate indicates a shift among CEE countries toward diversifying economic relations beyond the EU. A second indicator analyzed is the comparative foreign direct investment from the EU and China into CEE countries. Charts 4 and 5 indicate a rising trend in Chinese FDI since 2012, with China’s investment showing a steeper upward trajectory than that of the EU, particularly in capital flows. China's FDI growth in CEE countries reached 15.3%, surpassing the EU's 13.8% growth rate. In terms of investment stocks, China exhibited a 16.6% growth compared to the EU’s 6.7%, highlighting China’s significant advantage in FDI. These figures suggest that China has outpaced the EU in FDI within CEE countries, maintaining a stronger and more dynamic growth trend in the region. Conclusions In summary, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has significantly strengthened economic relations between China and most Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC) through extensive economic plans and investments. This trend is clearly illustrated in the relevant charts, which highlight the growing alignment of CEEC economies with China’s higher growth rates and the deepening economic integration between the two regions. However, since 2020, the BRI has faced challenges, including the Covid-19 pandemic, the war in Ukraine, and political disputes between China and CEEC. Despite these setbacks, the data presented in this article suggests that the BRI remains a powerful force with significant potential to further enhance economic ties between China and CEEC. Consequently, it can be argued that the BRI has, to some extent, weakened economic integration within the European Union, particularly in the realms of foreign trade and foreign direct investment. Introduction In 1996, China launched a long-term modernization plan aimed at promoting the economic development of its western regions, aligned with the Go West campaign and the Made in China 2025 initiative. These strategies were designed to elevate China's global standing in high-tech industries, while the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), introduced in 2013 by President Xi Jinping, sought to establish transit corridors for goods and services across Asia, Africa, and Europe. Together with China's peaceful rise strategy, these initiatives aim to position China among the world's top powers by 2025. A critical component in implementing the BRI is the 14+1 Agreement, a framework for cooperation between China and several Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC). Originally proposed as the 16+1 in 2011, it became the 17+1 in 2018 with Greece's inclusion, and was later reduced to 14+1 following Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia exit in 2021 and 2022, respectively. The primary objective of this Agreement is to enhance regional cooperation and facilitate significant Chinese investments in the industries and infrastructure of CEEC. Under this framework, China has committed to undertake infrastructure projects, such as upgrading and developing ports, communication networks, bridges, and railway lines. According to what was mentioned, the main goal of this research is to answer the following question: “how the Belt and Road Initiative has affected the economic integration of the European Union”. In response, the research hypothesis is proposed as follows: “In alignment with the People's Republic of China’s ‘Go West’ campaign, the implementation of the 14+1 Agreement has led to an increase in foreign trade and a rise in the rate of Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) in the region. This, in turn, has contributed to economic divergence within the European Union.” Method In this research, the hypothesis was comprehensively explored by integrating Cantori and Spiegel's theoretical framework with Policy Analysis and Econometric Modelling. The study focuses on the timeframe from 2010 to 2023, providing a robust temporal scope for analysis. Results According to the defined indicators, foreign trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) statistics between the European Union, China, and the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC) were reviewed for the period of 2010–2022 (up to 2021 for FDI). The results of these reviews and comparisons reveal that CEEC maintained the highest rate of trade with the European Union and their neighboring states, reflecting complementary economies in the region and favorable conditions for regional convergence. A notable outcome of the Belt and Road Initiative and the 14+1 Agreement is the significant increase in trade between China and CEEC. Based on the data in Table 3, and after calculating the growth rate of foreign trade between China, the European Union, and these countries, the necessary information and statistics were obtained to plot Charts 2 and 3. The statistical data from these tables and graphs can be summarized as follows:  EU Foreign Trade with CEEC: Chart 2 illustrates that the EU's imports and exports with Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries have experienced consistent, exponential growth overall. Table 4 shows a 5.8% growth in EU imports from CEE countries and a 5.4% growth in exports to these countries. Additionally, Table 4 identifies four points of disruption in EU-CEE trade relations, which are clearly marked in Chart 2. Overall, trade between the EU and CEE countries grew by 5.6%, reflecting steady and robust economic ties.  China’s Foreign Trade with CEEC: Analysis of Table 3 reveals an 8.5% increase in China’s imports from CEE countries and a 9.2% increase in exports from China to these countries. Chart 3 confirms this growth trend, showing disruptions only at three points: 2012, 2015, and 2022. China’s trade with CEE countries has grown at a higher rate than the EU's, achieving a 9.03% increase from 2010 to 2022, which suggests deepening economic ties. A comparison of Charts 2 and 3 highlights that while the EU's trade volume remains higher, China’s rapid growth rate indicates a shift among CEE countries toward diversifying economic relations beyond the EU. A second indicator analyzed is the comparative foreign direct investment from the EU and China into CEE countries. Charts 4 and 5 indicate a rising trend in Chinese FDI since 2012, with China’s investment showing a steeper upward trajectory than that of the EU, particularly in capital flows. China's FDI growth in CEE countries reached 15.3%, surpassing the EU's 13.8% growth rate. In terms of investment stocks, China exhibited a 16.6% growth compared to the EU’s 6.7%, highlighting China’s significant advantage in FDI. These figures suggest that China has outpaced the EU in FDI within CEE countries, maintaining a stronger and more dynamic growth trend in the region. Conclusions In summary, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has significantly strengthened economic relations between China and most Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC) through extensive economic plans and investments. This trend is clearly illustrated in the relevant charts, which highlight the growing alignment of CEEC economies with China’s higher growth rates and the deepening economic integration between the two regions. However, since 2020, the BRI has faced challenges, including the Covid-19 pandemic, the war in Ukraine, and political disputes between China and CEEC. Despite these setbacks, the data presented in this article suggests that the BRI remains a powerful force with significant potential to further enhance economic ties between China and CEEC. Consequently, it can be argued that the BRI has, to some extent, weakened economic integration within the European Union, particularly in the realms of foreign trade and foreign direct investment.

https://jpq.ut.ac.ir/article_101115_21896051ff6f82b6f18db157178db098.pdf