Introduction
Even as the world transitions through new phases in political, economic, social, cultural, and technological dimensions, the fundamental definition of the state —based on people, land, sovereignty, and government— remains largely unchanged. People, as a core component of the state, encompass many political and social opportunities and threats. The quality of social services, social acceptance, political legitimacy and ideological influence —all along with countless other variables—shape the fabric of society, collectively. This focus has led many West Asian countries to develop long-term national plans. Saudi Arabia, as a key regional rival of Iran, has sought to pursue a new course under the leadership of King Salman and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. Key initiatives include transitioning from an oil-dependent economy to a post-oil economy, fostering economic development, and expanding social freedoms. In the economic sphere, Aramco, the national oil giant, bears the costs of this transition. Socially, the growth of the middle class—primarily driven by the younger generation and technocrats like Mohammed bin Salman—aims to establish a new social base. Reforms promoting women’s rights and social liberties have continued to demand further freedoms. However, despite these reforms, political restrictions have persisted. Mohammed bin Salman’s approach to political figures such as Mohammed bin Nayef, the arrests at the Ritz-Carlton in November 2017, and the suppression of political parties and Brotherhood movement activists have caused political development to regress relative to economic progress. In Iran, during the second Pahlavi era, the political space was similarly constrained. The coup of 18 Mordad 1953 led to increased political repression, yet the surge in oil prices during the 1950s facilitated efforts to develop infrastructure. Despite this, the Pahlavi government was unable to control the political space effectively, leading to unbalanced development. The parallels between the unbalanced development approaches in pre-Islamic Revolution Iran and Saudi Arabia today suggest that Saudi Arabia's recent trajectory may have reached an impasse, with structural changes underway. This article aims to draw comparisons between these two political systems, focusing on their development experiences—specifically, Saudi Arabia today and the second Pahlavi era in Iran. We will examine the economic, political, and social dimensions of both cases through a comparative approach. Initially, we will address the concepts of sustainable development and participation, extracting key variables, followed by an analysis of the social variables in both periods.
 
Methodology
This research investigates the concept of unbalanced development through a descriptive-analytical approach, utilizing documentary data. It compares the policies of Saudi Arabia under King Salman with those of the second Pahlavi government, focusing specifically on three main areas: politics, economy, and society and culture, each comprising various interconnected variables.
 
Results and discussion
The process of unbalanced development seems to be emerging as a new model during an era when the liberal international order is weakening. China, as the most prominent example within this order, has managed to maintain political stability despite these global shifts. In this context, the common variables observed in Iran during the second Pahlavi era and in Saudi Arabia under King Salman merit detailed discussion. However, a key distinction between these two systems is their different temporal contexts; this does not necessarily mean that King Salman and Mohammed bin Salman will follow the same path as the Pahlavi government. While the economy is arguably the most critical initial step in the development process, economic progress alone is insufficient for holistic development. Historically, both the second Pahlavi government and King Salman’s administration began with ambitious economic programs aimed at achieving “civilization” through economic growth. Despite their shared goals, two vital variables have played influential roles: economic diversification—moving away from oil-dependent rentier economies—and attracting foreign investment as an essential alternative source of revenue. In the social sphere, variables such as the growth of a young population eager for participation in social, economic, and political decision-making, combined with increased urbanization, internal migration, and immigration, are transforming societal perceptions of participation. The expansion of educational infrastructure has fostered a significant educated middle class, which has become a key driver of political change. Over time, participation in social and economic spheres has spilled over into the political arena, leading to increased demands for political engagement. Since the political structures of both Iran and Saudi Arabia have been unwilling or unable to accommodate this rising participation, political activism has often occurred outside official channels. The second Pahlavi government responded swiftly to these developments, especially after the 1953 coup, whereas Saudi Arabia is still in the early stages of social development, with political participation not yet widespread. An important factor that inhibits revolutionary change in Saudi Arabia is its demographic composition, notably its large expatriate population, which creates significant social distinctions and helps maintain stability. Political variables, along with social and economic factors, are fundamental to development, yet in highly centralized systems, political change tends to lag behind social and economic transformations. During the second Pahlavi era, Iran was characterized by a highly centralized political structure, marked by an imbalance in foreign policy and a narrow view of political parties, which ultimately limited its ability to manage rapid development effectively.
 
Conclusion
The unbalanced development observed during the second Pahlavi period in Iran and in Saudi Arabia under King Salman, particularly at its peak, has brought the developmental trajectories of the two countries closer together. In both cases, the transition from economic to social development did not translate into political advancement. Although Saudi Arabia can be considered somewhat intermediate in this regard, its current movement trends do not indicate signs of political progress. The development model pursued by the second Pahlavi government ultimately led to widespread public dissatisfaction, culminating in the Islamic Revolution of 1979. However, this does not necessarily mean that the structural similarities or approaches of the two systems will produce identical outcomes. In Saudi Arabia, variables such as the diversity within the population have contributed to decreasing public cohesion regarding political participation. Conversely, the transformation of Saudi society from a traditional social structure into a modern one aligns with current social policy discourses, representing a significant point of difference from Iran’s Pahlavi society. Both cases start reform initiatives from the top—within central structures—meaning that these centralized systems continue to operate in a manner that maintains their centralization even while expanding social freedoms. The Chinese governance model offers an alternative example: despite being an unbalanced and less challenging development approach, it has demonstrated that economic and social development can be achieved without corresponding political reforms, leading to sustainable development in the medium term. Although this governance model differs from liberal democratic approaches, its practical reliability is evident at least over the medium term. During the Pahlavi era, Iran’s rapid adoption of the “open door” policy, combined with the lack of readiness within its political and social structures for genuine political development, ultimately led to structural collapse. In contrast, Saudi Arabia has so far been very cautious; despite Western pressures to expand political space, it has resisted significant reforms in this area. Instead, the Saudi government has attempted to offset this restriction by expanding public freedoms and investing in recreational and social infrastructure to temper public pressures, especially considering the large and youthful demographics. Nonetheless, it remains uncertain how effectively the Saudi government can meet the demands of social and economic development aligned with public expectations. Similar to the Pahlavi government, the Saudi regime—both under King Salman and potentially under Mohammed bin Salman—may face the phenomenon of “rising expectations,” which could ultimately lead to political deadlock.