Russia’s Withdrawal of the Ratification from the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban and Its Consequences

Document Type : Research Paper

Authors

1 Associate Professor, Nuclear Science and Technology Research Institute, Tehran, Iran

2 Professor, Department of International Relations, Faculty of Law & Political Science, University of Tehran, Iran

Abstract

Extended Abstract
Introduction
The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), concluded in September 1996, aimed to curb nuclear proliferation by prohibiting explosive nuclear testing. Although 187 states have signed the treaty and 177 have ratified it, however, the treaty has not yet implemented due to the specific procedural mechanism envisaged for its entry into force. On November 3, 2023, Russia, which had ratified the CTBT in 2000 after signing it in 1996, in a letter to the Secretary General of the United Nations, announced its withdrawal of ratification from the treaty. This decision sparked international reactions and raised questions about the compatibility of Russia’s action with international norms and the potential legal and security consequences. This article examines the legality of Russia’s withdrawal of ratification from the treaty and analyzes its impacts on the treaty, international nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament regime, and international peace and security.
Methodology
The research method is a combination of legal analysis and trend impact techniques. In analyzing the legality of Russia’s action, the working method consists of inferring the rules by referring to relevant regulations, customs and procedures, and the method of analysis in the evaluation of the consequences of this action is based on the trend impact analysis.
Findings
The findings of this study are discussed under the following themes:
1.Legality of Russia’s Ratification Withdrawal
International law, the CTBT provisions, and United Nations Secretariat Practice do not prohibit a state (Russia) from withdrawing its ratification from the treaty (CTBT).
2.Negative Effects on Treaty Implementation
Given Russia’s significant nuclear capabilities and its historical role and efforts to facilitate entry into force of the treaty, its withdrawal of ratification from the treaty will pose challenges to the CTBT’s implementation and increase harnesses to the implementation of the treaty.

3. Impact on Non-Proliferation and Disarmament regime and international peace and security.

 The CTBT plays a crucial role in preventing nuclear weapon proliferation and promoting nuclear disarmament. Russia’s withdrawal of ratification from the treaty intensifies challenges related to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament and international peace and security.
Analysis
From the very beginning, Russia has played an important and effective role in drafting and concluding and then facilitating entry into force of the CTBT. The Russian Federation was among the first states signed the treaty in 1996 and ratified it in 2000. However, following escalating tensions between the Russia and the United States, especially in the aftermath of the Ukraine conflict in February 2022, Russia made the decision on November 3, 2023, to withdraw its ratification from the treaty. The central question pertains to the compatibility of Russia’s action with established norms of international law. Does the de-ratification of the treaty by Russia conform to the rules of international law?”
Under international law, there is no explicit prohibition preventing a government from withdrawing its ratification of a treaty. Consequently, Russia’s decision to withdraw from the CTBT cannot be construed as a violation of its legal obligations. However, this withdrawal will impact entry into force of treaty and   will have consequences for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime as well as peace and international security. Russia’s withdrawal has the potential to dissuade states from joining the treaty or prompt existing contracting parties to retract their ratification Russia’s withdrawal can   discourage states to join the treaty or encourage existing contracting parties to withdraw their ratification from the treaty. Given the pivotal and consequential role played by the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in curbing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, Russia’s withdrawal from its ratification may undermine the bedrock of the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament framework, rendering it less effective. This development raises legitimate security apprehensions and concerns on the global stage.
Conclusions
While international law and practice do not explicitly prohibit Russia from withdrawing its ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), this action poses significant challenges for the treaty’s future implementation. The withdrawal may have negative consequences for the global regime of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, as well as international peace and security. As a signatory state to the CTBT, the Islamic Republic of Iran must closely monitor developments related to Russia’s withdrawal. The potential international and security implications require Iran to carefully assess the various consequences and adopt an appropriate approach in response to this issue.

Keywords

Main Subjects


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