Abstract
In 1949, amid the political developments following the 1941 occupation of Iran, Article 48 of the Supplement to the Iranian Constitution was amended, granting the Shah the authority to dissolve the National Assembly. This change marked a pivotal moment in the re-consolidation of power within the monarchy and the delegitimization of the Constitutional Revolution’s achievements in limiting royal authority. Employing the theoretical framework of historical institutionalism, this study investigates the political-institutional context of this transformation. The findings indicate that the institutional centralization initiated under Reza Shah persisted even after the ostensible transition to democracy in the post-1941 period. Structural weaknesses in the parliament and the executive branch, the inefficacy of political parties, an unstable political environment, and the Shah’s manipulation of crises, along with the vested interests of global powers, created fertile ground for redefining the monarchy’s role. Within this context, the granting of the right to dissolve parliament was not the outcome of a personal decision but rather the result of a historically embedded institutional path that favored the monarchy. This article illustrates how entrenched institutional structures can influence the trajectory of major political transformations and how, despite significant social upheavals such as revolutions, previous power configurations may persist.