POLITICAL QUARTERLY

POLITICAL QUARTERLY

Theoretical Fetishism, Theoreticism, and Constrained Research in the Humanities: The Case of the Literature on Iran’s Nuclear Program

Document Type : Research Paper

Authors
1 Associate Professor, World Studies, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran.
2 Professor, International Relations, Allameh Tabataba’i University, Tehran, Iran.
3 Assistant Professor, World Studies, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran.
10.22059/jpq.2026.410622.1008521
Abstract
Extended Abstract
Introduction
This article critically examines the concept of theory-ladenness, emphasizing how theoretical, conceptual, and cognitive presuppositions shape observation and knowledge production. Rooted in post-positivist philosophy of science and linked to the Frankfurt School’s critical theory, theory-ladenness challenges the notion of neutral knowledge, framing it instead as a vehicle for domination and ideological reproduction. Tracing the historical evolution of this concept from the Enlightenment to contemporary debates, the article demonstrates that scientific observations are never entirely free from mental frameworks and social interests. The rigid segregation of theories is presented not merely as an academic concern but as a mechanism for maintaining intellectual hegemony. The study argues that research is inevitably influenced by underlying interests and that conceptual audacity and epistemic breakthroughs require liberation from both entrenched theoretical frameworks and self-serving biases. Drawing on Kuhn’s paradigm shift, this paper emphasizes the necessity of critical awareness and methodological reflexivity in the humanities to free knowledge from ideological constraints and interest-driven distortions.

Methodology
This study adopts a qualitative, analytical-conceptual methodology, focusing on historical and philosophical inquiry rather than empirical testing. The research involves a systematic review and critical interpretation of primary and secondary texts, including key philosophical works, contemporary articles, and historical case studies. The analysis traces the development of theory-ladenness from the Enlightenment (Locke, Kant) through twentieth-century positivism, falsificationism, and the epistemic debates surrounding Einstein and Bohr. It also critically examines foundational texts of critical theory (Adorno, Horkheimer, Marcuse, Habermas) and applies these insights to the social sciences, particularly international relations. Data were drawn exclusively from secondary sources, with interpretive analysis emphasizing the role of theoretical presuppositions, conceptual abstraction, and social interests in shaping observation and knowledge. The study identifies gaps in the current literature regarding the historical-philosophical trajectory of theory-ladenness and its entanglement with interests in humanities research.
Results and Discussion
The study identifies three primary interpretations of theory-ladenness:
1. Theoretical Fetishism – Drawing on Marxist thought (Lukács), this form attributes independent, almost magical power to concepts, detaching them from their social and historical origins, thereby distorting practice and reinforcing intellectual hierarchies.
2. Theoreticism – Emerging from French Marxism (Althusser), this perspective prioritizes theoretical practice over material or political action, often neglecting the practical struggle necessary for social transformation.
3. Theory-Ladenness (Neutral Post-Positivist Usage) – Advanced by Hanson, Kuhn, and Feyerabend, this descriptive concept demonstrates that no observation is theory-neutral; all data are interpreted through existing conceptual frameworks, making scientific revolutions contingent upon paradigm shifts rather than incremental empirical accumulation.
Critical theory situates these forms of theory-ladenness within social, cultural, and power-laden contexts, highlighting how hidden interests influence knowledge production. In the field of international relations, this manifests in rigid adherence to theoretical frameworks such as realism or liberalism, which can constrain intellectual dialogue and marginalize alternative perspectives.
The study illustrates these dynamics through the case of Iran’s nuclear program. Western and policy-focused analyses often favor threat-centric frameworks aligned with realist paradigms. Alternative analyses emphasizing diplomacy, legality, or regional dynamics are frequently marginalized, irrespective of empirical or logical validity, due to entrenched theoretical biases. Publications such as Foreign Affairs, The New York Times, and The Washington Post demonstrate that acceptance of an analysis depends less on methodological rigor and more on its alignment with prevailing theoretical paradigms. Conversely, articles that challenge these paradigms are labeled “idealistic,” “non-scientific,” or “normatively biased,” illustrating how theory-ladenness shapes both epistemic authority and policy discourse.

Conclusion
The findings underscore that knowledge in the humanities, particularly in international relations, is inherently shaped by theoretical presuppositions and social interests. Recognizing the multiplicity of forms of theory-ladenness is essential for avoiding both rigid theoretical fetishism and interest-driven distortions. Scholars must cultivate critical awareness to transcend conventional paradigms, fostering intellectual flexibility and conceptual innovation. Drawing on Kuhn’s paradigm shift and the insights of critical theory, the study advocates for a reflective approach that balances methodological rigor with openness to diverse perspectives, enabling more robust, equitable, and conceptually daring scholarship in the humanities.
Keywords
Subjects

References
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Volume 56, Issue 3
Summer 2026
Pages 834-805

  • Receive Date 18 February 2026
  • Revise Date 15 July 2026
  • Accept Date 18 July 2026