Theoretical Reasons for Deterrence Failure (Case Study: Israel’s 2025 Attack on Iran)

Document Type : Research Paper

Authors

1 Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, Political Science and history, Yazd University, Yazd, Iran.

2 Associate Professor, Political Science, Faculty of Law, Political Science & History, Yazd University, Yazd, Iran.

Abstract

Introduction
Deterrence failure occurs when an attacker state launches a military strike against a defender state (thereby changing the status quo), or when the defender retreats from its demands (thus maintaining the status quo) as a result of threats from the attacker. Conversely, successful deterrence means that the attacking actor withdraws from its planned attack, leaving the status quo unchanged. In other words, the goal of deterrence is control—specifically, controlling the behavior of the opposing state—and the condition for its success is the avoidance of war.
In this regard, the central question of this research is: What were the most important theoretical reasons and causes for the failure of deterrence in Iran-Israel relations, particularly regarding Israel's military attack on Iran in 2025? To answer this question, the theoretical explanations for deterrence failure are examined through multiple lenses: levels of analysis, the constituent elements of deterrence, perceptual and cognitive approaches, rational approaches, and semantic and discursive approaches.
 
Methodology
Deterrence studies encompass several categories: theoretical studies, game theory analyses, statistical studies of various deterrence cases (including both failures and successes), and specific case studies of deterrence between two countries. This paper is a qualitative study that focuses on a single case study and applies theory to that specific case. In other words, as an explanatory study, it seeks to identify which theoretical causes (independent variables) explain Israel's attack on Iran (the dependent variable) based on theories of deterrence failure. Data collection relies on theoretical sources accessed virtually, and data analysis is conducted through the application of theory to the case.
 
Results and Discussion
The Iran-Israel conflict is often characterized as an asymmetric conflict, meaning that the two sides have employed conventional but uneven means throughout their confrontation. The deterrence in question is unilateral and immediate: we are faced with an attacking or challenging actor on one side and a defending actor seeking to maintain the status quo on the other. In Israel's war against Iran, the strategy of "limited military operations for limited goals" has been employed.
The research findings indicate that Israel's attack on Iran can be explained through various theoretical frameworks, including rational models of deterrence (classical, sequential, and perfect models), cognitive models (prospect theory and ontological security), and the "power cycle" model.
Within rational deterrence models, the conflict is viewed as a game between two rational actors with different stages. At each stage, each actor decides how to act in the next stage based on rational choice and the calculation of benefits and losses, taking into account the possibility of different scenarios at each stage of the game.
In contrast, the cognitive model of prospect theory focuses on the attacker's perceptions of the current situation and expected utility. Unlike rational theory, prospect theory holds that actors tend to be risk-averse when choosing between greater gains, but risk-seeking when facing greater losses.
 
Conclusion
Based on the research findings, the Islamic Republic of Iran has four scenarios for responding to the situation of deterrence failure resulting from a military attack. These scenarios include:
1.Withdrawing from international agreements and norms and becoming a nuclear weapons state (converting conventional deterrence into nuclear deterrence)
2.Strengthening missile capabilities
3.Halting missile activities as a factor that creates and intensifies the insecurity dilemma
4.Increasing the credibility of its threats to deter future attacks

Keywords

Main Subjects

References

References
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POLITICAL QUARTERLY
Volume 56, Issue 2
June 2026
Pages 460-431

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History

  • Receive Date: 10 November 2025
  • Revise Date: 24 December 2025
  • Accept Date: 13 April 2026

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