نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی
نویسندگان
1 استادیار، گروه جامعهشناسی، دانشگاه تربیت مدرس، تهران، ایران.
2 استادیار، گروه جغرافیای سیاسی، دانشگاه تربیت مدرس، تهران، ایران.
چکیده
کلیدواژهها
موضوعات
عنوان مقاله [English]
نویسندگان [English]
Extended abstract
Introduction
The scarcity of renewable freshwater resources and reserves is one of the major threats and sustainable challenges facing the world in the 21st century. Ensuring the availability of sufficient fresh water to maintain the health and well-being of people and the ecosystems in which they live, and to meet the world's food demand, which is expected to double by 2050, is one of the world's most important challenges. Among the 286 internationally shared watersheds, the Tigris and Euphrates basin can be included in the list of the tensest transboundary watersheds in the world, along with the Nile basin. The issue of exploitation and sharing water resources in the Tigris and Euphrates basin as the largest transboundary basin in West Asia, is very important, and this region is politically tense, with shortages coupled with increasing demand and intense competition for access and more exploitation of water. Many studies have been done in this area using national and national perspectives, but what is needed is the analysis and stratification of transnational hydro-political actors and activists, i.e., local communities. These communities in the Tigris and Euphrates basin can be divided into a more general category of religious and linguistic groups. It is therefore necessary to examine these groups from the view point of the advantages and disadvantages of water projects.
The theoretical orientation of the current research is derived from the ecological reality of the region. From this point of view, the natural geography of the basin, in interaction with human communities, has led to the formation of ethnic, religious groups and a particular social structure, which are usually in competition, conflict and rarely interact with each other. The scarce source of water has fueled or influenced these confrontations and conflicts. From an analytical point of view, the current research is based on the social reading of "conflicting identities" organized around the "scarce water source". The "unit of analysis" of the present study is the entire basin and the sub-basins identified. The "units of observation" are ethnic and religious groups. In this study, Turkey is seen as the hydro-hegemon and the designer and implementer of the Gap Project in the upstream depending on the severity of the impact and the type of impact of Turkey's water development plans. Therefore, the main focus of this research is an attempt to understand the perception of the Stakeholders of the water projects in the Tigris and Euphrates basin from an ethnic and religious point of view.
Methodology
The present study examines the social impact of the implementation of the GAP project on downstream countries. Using the descriptive and analytic method and the available sources, this article tries to identify the losers and the benefits of the ethno-religious winners of the Tigris and Euphrates basin water projects. After collecting the necessary data, the Stakeholders are ranked using the Simple Weighting Method (SAW).
Finding
The developments of the Gap project since its launch until today can be considered in six stages:
Gap is a water and land resource development project
GAP is a multi-sector and integrated project (1984-1989)
Gap in purgatory (1989-1993)
GAP is a sustainable human development project (1994-2001)
Gap is a market-based project (2002-2011)
New Gap.
The social conflicts caused by water development projects in the sample societies can be categorized into two upstream basins, namely Turkey, and two downstream basins, namely Syria and Iraq. In the case of the upper reaches of the basin, i.e. Turkey, the analysis of macro-conflicts shows the deep-rooted conflict and resistance of the ethnic group, centered on the Kurds, against the national group.
The fact is that both groups have a different analysis of the social impact of the project. In the case of the local group, there is more concern about integrating the ethnic group, removing the obstacles to the social and economic development of the region and confronting the destructive movements of the militants, although this is usually not openly expressed. As far as the ethnic group is concerned, it should be acknowledged that this project has its own positive and negative consequences, disrupting the traditional social fabric, changing the way of life, the demographic composition of employment and education. Not many studies have been carried out on how the project has developed in Turkey over the last four decades, especially from a social point of view.
With regard to the bottom of the basin, i.e. Iraq and Syria, the weakness of the government and its fragility in Iraq and Syria, the reduction of social capital between the groups, the water problems in these two countries, the remoteness of sustainable solutions to resolve water conflicts within the country, the conflict over the issue of water between communities are among important factors. In the local and upstream and downstream provinces, the historical experience of conflict and collective memory, and the transformation of the water issue into an element of ethnic consciousness centered on the Kurds due to their superior hydro-political position will continue.
Conclusions
According to the calculations, the Stakeholders at the lower levels are more affected by several national levels. The area mentioned is the Turkish government, and perhaps the benefit of Alevi descendants is partly due to the strengthening of Turkey’s upstream location. But in the case of Iraq, the situation of the Sunni Kurds is better than that of the Sunni and Shiite Arabs, and finally it can be said that the Shiite Arabs are affected by the interaction of different conditions compared to the ethno-religious groups with a more dangerous situation than the water development plans mentioned above: Risks caused by drought in the lower reaches of the basin, the weak increase in migration from rural areas affected by climate change and the decline in the quality and quantity of water to the outskirts of cities, the population density in informal settlements in Basra province, and the deprivation of special water and sanitation networks and vulnerability.
کلیدواژهها [English]
References
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