Extended abstract
In 1949, amid the political developments following the 1941 occupation of Iran, Article 48 of the Supplement to the Iranian Constitution was amended, granting the Shah the authority to dissolve the National Assembly. This change marked a pivotal moment in the reconsolidation of power within the monarchy and the delegitimization of the Constitutional Revolution’s achievements in limiting royal authority. Employing the theoretical framework of historical institutionalism, this study investigates the political‑institutional context of this transformation. The findings indicate that the institutional centralization initiated under Reza Shah persisted even after the ostensible transition to democracy in the post‑1941 period. Structural weaknesses in the parliament and the executive branch, the inefficacy of political parties, an unstable political environment, the Shah’s manipulation of crises, and the vested interests of global powers created fertile ground for redefining the monarchy’s role. Within this context, the granting of the right to dissolve parliament was not the outcome of a personal decision but rather the result of a historically embedded institutional path that favored the monarchy. This article illustrates how entrenched institutional structures can influence the trajectory of major political transformations and how, despite significant social upheavals such as revolutions, previous power configurations may persist.
Despite the establishment of modern facilities in the country’s administrative and executive structure during Reza Shah’s reign, this development was never accompanied by political progress or the growth of democratic institutions. Even prominent symbols of the Constitutional Revolution, such as the National Consultative Assembly, were rendered politically ineffective within the oppressive and autocratic environment of Reza Khan’s rule.
After September 1941, the country experienced significant power struggles. The main contenders in these disputes were the National Consultative Assembly, the executive branch, the court, influential figures such as Qavam ol‑Saltaneh and Mosaddegh, and foreign embassies. In addition to the internal institutional factors that gradually led to the constitutional amendment of 1950, certain events also strengthened the Shah’s resolve to revise the constitution. The most significant of these events was the attempted assassination of the Shah in February 1949 during his visit to Tehran University, which marked the beginning of the constitutional revision project.
The incompatibility and tension between relatively rapid socio‑economic transformations and the prevailing political system became increasingly apparent, heralding a major crisis that would emerge with the demise of the autocratic ruler. Although the constitution largely defined the Shah’s duties as ceremonial, in practice it was not the constitution that effectively determined the limits of royal authority. Instead, the institutional capability of the monarchy within the country’s political body dictated the extent of royal power and its application in the constitutional monarchy. In reality, deeply rooted past methods had transformed the entire governmental apparatus into an executive arm of the court. Since Reza Shah’s era, a coordinated integration had taken root between the government and the court and between the army and the court.
Following Reza Shah’s departure from Iran and Mohammad Reza Shah’s accession, the court’s influence diminished considerably, but its institutional position remained unchanged. Consequently, a struggle for power and dominance in political activity commenced. Within these political conflicts and rivalries, the court, with its young and vulnerable shah, emerged as the primary, albeit cautious, claimant to supreme power.
Although the power of the court waned with the fall of the powerful and autocratic Pahlavi monarch, the new shah’s authority—due to the institutional capacity of the monarchy—was sufficient to guarantee his privileged position. This meant that the court’s influence and intervention consistently had a decisive impact on the future and opportunities of its loyalists, dependents, and even the ruling elite as a whole. Therefore, even when the court’s power was reduced, the shah’s potential reactions could significantly influence the plans and calculations of the elite and political statesmen, ensuring that his primary role in power dynamics was never disregarded.
To analyze the reasons for granting the shah the right to dissolve parliament—an act contrary to the law of constitutional monarchy—the approach of historical institutionalism is employed. Historical institutionalism, a major branch of institutional theories in political science, emphasizes the role of institutions, historical paths, and institutional lock‑in in the formation and persistence of power structures. In this approach, institutions are understood not merely as legal rules but as established patterns of behavior and distributions of power that form and change within specific historical contexts. One of the core concepts of this theory is path dependency, which illustrates how initial and institutionalized choices constrain the trajectory of political evolution.