مفهوم ارزش ذاتی در سنت فکری لیبرالیسم: مطالعۀ موردی آیزایا برلین

Introduction
Whenever the values of an individual or a group of foreigners have been condemned in any way, the condemnor have probably referred to the non-universal or non-intrinstic nature of the values in question. The most prominent example is when, under the pretext of liberating a foreign society from the clutches of particular or non-intrinsic values, the condemnors directly interfere in the affairs of that society and invade their country. One common justification for such criticism and intervention is that the value of that individual or group of foreigners does not conform to the values of the general public in their own society or the values of the general public in the world. Another justification is that the value of that individual or group of foreigners is intrinsicly wrong and unnatural. At first glance, these justifications are not problematic because why should we adopt a value that goes against tradition, common sense, or our own nature? But the fundamental question is whether the values of those critics, to which they invite foreigners, are truly universal and intrinsic or are merely assumed to be so? What value is universal or intrinsic?
 
Methodology
This research adopts a meta-ethical framework and employs deductive reasoning to address its central questions. We first establish our stance on the plurality of values by examining two contrasting schools of thought: value pluralism and ethical monism. Subsequently, we analyze the values of the liberal political system. While its proponents present liberalism as the primary defender of value pluralism and the optimal societal model, in practice, liberal thinkers and politicians have frequently engaged in direct or indirect criticism of non-liberal societies' values, and have at times violated them. Finally, by providing precise definitions of universal and intrinsic values, the study offers a specific critique of Isaiah Berlin’s pluralistic liberalism. It argues that Berlin's framework erroneously presents certain higher-ranked liberal values as both universal and intrinsic. Under the pretext of preserving a minimum threshold of these values, this approach legitimizes measures that lead to unintended and destructive political consequences.
 
Findings and Analysis
For simplicity, an intrinsic value is usually defined as something we value for its own sake. In contrast, an instrumental value is usually defined as something we value as a means to achieve another value. Unfortunately, these definitions are more like an incomplete cheat sheet written hastily the night before the exam.

E. Moore, one of the great philosophers of ethics, provides a better and more complex definition of intrinsic values: “It is impossible for what is strictly one and the same thing to possess that kind of value at one time, or in one set of circumstances, and not to possess it at another” (Moore, 1922: 261). In other words, intrinsic value is a value that depends on the nature and essence of a thing, and its existence and intensity never change.

Under this more complete definition, the concepts of negative freedom and positive freedom, as articulated by Isaiah Berlin, would not logically have intrinsic values. Because if freedom has intrinsic value, then, for example, freedom to torture should not be permissible in a place where it is intended for self-torture, and impermissible in another place where it is intended for the freedom to torture others or, more generally as liberals say, impinge others’ freedom. Yet, John Stuart Mill, in his essay “On Liberty,” considers this to be the very first principle of liberalism (Mill, 1984: Chapter V).
In other words, whenever the question “In what aspect is it valuable?” is honestly asked, there is a strong possibility that the value in question is not intrinsic, as the conditions seem to determine its type or degree of value. If we want to give an example of truly intrinsic values, we can say that saving the lives of other human beings is intrinsically valuable, and there is never a need to ask, “In what aspect or to whom is it valuable?”
There is also no doubt that the degree of non-intrinsic values such as positive freedom or negative freedom will be different in practice if we lack the inner ability or have external limitations to utilize our freedom. As Berlin himself says, “What is freedom to those who cannot make use of it?” (Berlin, 1969: 171).
 
Conclusion
Now that the intrinsicality of values is not what we expected it to be, what term should we use to refer to acts that we value solely for their own sake? None. Because, according to John Dewey, such a situation does not exist at all. Dewey argues that a meaningful relationship between instrumental values and intrinsic values (in the conventional sense) is only possible in an isolated and disconnected space where we use a tool to achieve a goal, and there is no other goal after that forever. However, real life is not a hodgepodge of isolated and disconnected acts; our acts are interconnected in a chain. “For treating the end as merely immediate and exclusively final is equivalent to refusal to consider what will happen after and because a particular end is reached” (Dewey, 1939: 26).
With this in mind, what is the necessity of retaining the concept of universal values? Firstly, only this concept distinguishes Berlin’s value pluralism from radical relativism, and therefore, pluralists cannot abandon it until a better alternative is found. Secondly, human existence confirms the sharing of a set of values in the value system of most people in the world throughout history.
But if we prove the universality of some values, not as a historical fact but as a metaphysical truth in the void, then nothing will stop us from assuming that our particular values, like Isaiah Berlin’s, are universal. Then, our infallible argument would be, “Although our value has never been a value for anyone but a minority, we say that it ought to be intrinsically a value for all human beings,” which is very dangerous. But, on the other hand, if we use the term “universal values” in the precise sense as a fact, we provide common ground for debate, negotiation, and compromise.