از جهانگیری به جهانداری: بنیادهای استقرار سلطنت پاتریمونیال در ایران سنتی

Extended Abstract
This article examines dominant approaches to analyzing state formation in pre-modern Iran, which typically fall into two frameworks influenced by modern social science: those emphasizing class struggle (the orthodox Marxist approach) and those centered on the management of scarce water resources (the theory of Oriental Despotism). The study begins by critiquing these established models. It then proposes an alternative perspective by synthesizing Ibn Khaldun's concept of tribal asabiyyah (social cohesion) with Max Weber's analysis of charismatic authority. According to this synthesized view, state formation in pre-modern Iran is understood as a process initiated by successful conquests led by a charismatic warrior at the head of a tribal coalition. The culmination of such a conquest was the establishment of a precarious and unstable state, fundamentally centered on the authority of its charismatic leader. A central aim of this article is to analyze the reasons, dimensions, and outcomes of the significant structural and functional transformations these states underwent in subsequent stages. To achieve this aim, the article addresses the following three questions:

What factors necessitated the transition from a state based on charismatic-tribal authority to a more institutionalized form of government?
What were the defining characteristics, core elements, and foundational pillars of the subsequent transformation in the state's structure and function?
Ultimately, what specific type of state emerged in traditional Iran as a result of these historical transformations?

The article's conclusions are derived from a critical engagement with Ibn Khaldun's concept of 'asabiyya and an application of Max Weber's analysis of the transition from charismatic to traditional authority.
Ibn Khaldun, influenced by a certain nostalgia for tribal asabiyyah and its perceived primacy over urban civilization, interpreted the shift from a rudimentary tribal state to an institutionalized monarchy as a process of decline—a weakening of social cohesion leading inevitably to the state's collapse. Consequently, he did not seriously examine the underlying necessities driving this transformation. In contrast, Max Weber's analysis, while acknowledging the revolutionary power of charismatic movements, highlighted their inherent instability. He argued that such authority is fundamentally volatile and incompatible with the routine demands of daily life and economic stability. From a Weberian perspective, factors including the death of the charismatic leader, the impossibility of maintaining a permanent state of exception, the pressures of adapting to routine administration, and the elite's desire to secure their power and privileges collectively necessitate a transition from charismatic to traditional authority. The evolution of unstable conquest states into stable "patrimonial monarchies" in traditional Iran serves as a definitive illustration of this Weberian transition.
Guided by this theoretical framework, the article demonstrates that the states established by tribal coalitions in Iran following the Turk-Mongol invasions were characterized by inherent instability. These political formations exhibited several destabilizing features:
First, the stability of the entire coalition was critically dependent on the personal authority of the charismatic leader, whose death consistently placed the state at risk of immediate collapse. Second, the coalition itself was inherently fragile, undermined by the perpetual internecine conflicts endemic to tribal societies. Third, the allied tribes participated primarily for material gain and spoils; when these expectations were unmet, former allies could rapidly become enemies. Fourth, a core Turkic political belief held that governance and conquered territory belonged collectively to the entire ruling clan, a principle that structurally prevented the centralization of power. Fifth, the need to satisfy the material interests of the ruling clan and tribal leaders—often through the mechanism of the *iqta'* (land grant) system—resulted in the continuous fragmentation of both power and territory. Sixth, the very social structure of the tribes, while agile and effective for rapid conquest, was ill-suited for the complex administration of a large, sedentary population and territory. Finally, an economic model based on plunder, which tribal culture often valorized, was fundamentally incompatible with the requirements of a stable state economy reliant on sustained agriculture and long-distance commerce.
Therefore, the article's findings indicate that the inherently unstable nature of the state established by charismatic leaders, combined with the imperatives of governing a vast territory, propelled the conquerors toward an inevitable transition in the state's structure and function.
The core of the article addresses the second research question by identifying and explaining the seven pillars that constituted the quantitative and qualitative transformation of the state's structure and function.
The first pillar was a fundamental transformation in the ideology and practice of the state, marked by the acceptance of a centralized monarchy model. Following the death of the founding charismatic leader, his ideology and governing practices coalesced into a new legitimizing tradition for his successors. However, this nascent tradition was contested; tribal chiefs and the leader's original companions invoked it to emphasize their own right to participate in determining the new ruler and to engage directly in governance, creating a persistent tension between centralizing authority and tribal power-sharing.
On the other hand, members of the ruling family, adhering to the Turkic notion that governance was the collective property of the entire clan, insisted on the division of power among prominent relatives. In direct opposition to these centrifugal forces, the monarchs (sultan/shah), inspired by the pre-existing Iranian concept of absolute and divinely-sanctioned kingship, actively sought to concentrate all authority in their own person and establish a hereditary line of succession, typically through the eldest son. Iranian bureaucrats, exemplified by figures like Khwaja Nizam al-Mulk, were the primary theorists and proponents of this centralizing interpretation. An element deeply intertwined with this monarchical tendency was the deliberate adoption of the sophisticated Iranian tradition of statecraft and administration, of which these very bureaucrats were the custodians and representatives.
The second pillar involved the deliberate weakening of tribal military forces and the concurrent establishment of a slave army. While the tribes were the foundational pillar of the initial conquest state and thus viewed themselves as partners in governance, their loyalty to any single ruler was inherently unstable, with a constant risk of rebellion. To stabilize the state and secure the monarch's position, it became necessary to create a new, loyal military institution. This pivotal transition was achieved through the formation of a *ghulam* (slave soldier) army, which represented a major shift in the state's power base from autonomous tribal forces to a professional military beholden solely to the monarch.
The third pillar was the revival and systematic utilization of pre-existing Iranian bureaucratic structures. The administration of vast conquered territories demanded a sophisticated knowledge of governance and established institutions that the tribal conquerors inherently lacked. Iran, however, possessed a deep-rooted tradition of statecraft, complete with complex institutions, administrative rules, and standardized procedures. The custodians of this system—the bureaucratic class—as they had done with previous conquerors, swiftly entered the service of the new Turkic rulers. They thereby became the essential executive arm for managing the empire's fiscal, administrative, and day-to-day affairs.
The fourth pillar involved the critical organization of a formal fiscal system. Establishing a regular mechanism for state revenue and expenditure was essential to transition from a disorganized, plunder-based tribal economy to a sustainable state economy. This transformation was accomplished by reviving and adapting the sophisticated tax system inherited from the Sasanian era, and through the strategic innovation of the *iqta'* and *tiyul* systems, which allocated land revenues to finance the military and reward service.
The fifth pillar entailed the systematic weakening of centrifugal forces. To create a cohesive state structure, it was necessary to overcome the dispersion of power and reduce the multiplicity of autonomous centers. This was achieved through a dual strategy combining coercive measures with negotiated settlements. The coercive approach involved the direct application of force to subjugate local rulers and integrate their territories under central authority. Conversely, the compromise approach resulted from bargaining, which led to a mutual recognition of authority between the central government and local powers.
The sixth pillar involved the strategic integration of the state with the subjugated society. Although founded on conquest, the state's long-term continuity required two critical steps: first, developing a legitimizing mechanism to gain the acceptance of the governed population for the new political order; and second, expanding the state's inclusivity by establishing formal links with influential social forces. These forces included urban notables—such as the ulama (religious scholars), sheikhs, major merchants, and sayyids (descendants of the Prophet)—as well as tribal chiefs, local power brokers, and landowners.
The seventh and final pillar consisted of symbolic measures designed to project authority and cultivate legitimacy. These actions included establishing a grand and prosperous capital city, founding a magnificent royal court, adhering to elaborate courtly traditions and ceremonies, creating enduring civilizational infrastructure, and acting as a patron of religion, science, and the arts.
The successful realization of these seven elements led to the establishment of the "Iranian patrimonial monarchy." However, not all conquering groups achieved this transition equally. The Seljuks and Safavids were the most successful, establishing vast empires. The Ghilzai Afghans were the least successful, failing to consolidate their rule and collapsing rapidly. Other groups fall between these extremes. The scale and durability of the resulting states were a direct function of their success in implementing this transition.