چرخش در سیاست خارجی چین در قبال افغانستان بعد از خروج امریکا

نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی

نویسنده

دکترای روابط بین الملل، دانشکده حقوق و علوم سیاسی، دانشگاه ملی تاجیکستان، دوشنبه، تاجیکستان.

10.22059/jpq.2026.390422.1008295

چکیده

خروج ایالات متحده از افغانستان در سال 2021، تحولات گسترده ای را در منطقه و سیاست خارجی قدرت‌های جهانی، از جمله چین، به همراه داشت. این مقاله به بررسی چرخش در سیاست خارجی چین در قبال افغانستان پس از خروج آمریکا می‌پردازد. برخلاف بسیاری از کشورها، چین چه قبل و چه بعد از آگوست 2021، تعاملات رسمی و رو به افزایشی با طالبان داشته است. با توجه به اهمیت اصل عدم مداخله و همچنین استراتژی اقتصاد محور در سیاست خارجی چین، و با عنایت به خروج امریکا از افغانستان، بسیاری از صاحبنظران مهمترین فاکتور تأثیرگذار بر نحوه تعامل چین با طالبان را ناشی از فرصت ایجاد شده برای بهره‌برداری از ذخایر طبیعی و زیرزمینی افغانستان دانسته و آن را در راستای طرح کمربند و راه تحلیل کرده‌اند. با بررسی روابط متغیر چین و افغانستان در ده‌های گذشته، به‌نظر می‌رسد منافع چین در مقطع کنونی فراتر از منفعت اقتصادی است. هدف پژوهش حاضر بررسی فاکتورهای امنیتی بر سیاست چین در قبال حکومت طالبان با ذکر این سؤال است: مهم‌ترین فاکتور تأثیرگذار بر نحوه تعامل چین با حکومت طالبان چیست؟ فرضیه این است که توانایی طالبان برای مهار گروه‌های جدایی‌طلب و تروریستی که امنیت ملی چین تهدید می‌کنند، مهمترین فاکتور تأثیرگذار بر نحوه تعامل چین با طالبان است. پژوهش حاضر با روش ردیابی فرآیند نشان داده است که از مقطع جنگ سرد تا کنون چین همواره ملاحظات امنیتی در افغانستان داشته و با خروج امریکا از افغانستان در سال 2021، مسئولیت حفظ ثبات و امنیت در افغانستان برای چین افزایش یافته است.

کلیدواژه‌ها

موضوعات


عنوان مقاله [English]

Shift in China's Foreign Policy towards Afghanistan after US Withdrawal

نویسنده [English]

  • Fardin Hashemi
PhD in International Relations, Faculty of Law and Political Science, Tajik National University, Dushanbe, Tajikistan.
چکیده [English]

Introduction
With the fall of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan in August 2021, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, led by the Taliban, took power in the country. Taliban leaders and representatives, both before and after coming to power, promised to form an inclusive government, to avoid discrimination against the country’s population, especially the Hazara Shiites, and to respect women’s rights. However, after gaining power, they shirked their commitments by adhering to a strict interpretation of Sharia, similar to their first period of rule (1996–2001). For these reasons, no country was willing to officially recognize the Taliban regime. Global institutions, Western countries, and the United States significantly reduced their aid to Afghanistan, with sanctions also imposed. Many countries closed their embassies in Afghanistan and refused to allow Taliban representatives to open embassies on their soil. Nevertheless, despite widespread criticism of the Taliban regime, China officially engaged with the Taliban from the beginning and has consistently expanded these interactions. Given the importance of the principle of non-intervention and China’s economy-driven foreign policy strategy, and considering the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, many analysts view China’s engagement with the Taliban as an opportunity to exploit Afghanistan’s natural and underground resources, aligning with the broader Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). However, the issue lies in the ideological alignment between the Taliban and militant groups such as the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and other groups that threaten China’s national interests and security. Considering this and the fact that China’s interactions with the Taliban began after President Obama announced the U.S. intention to withdraw troops from Afghanistan in 2012, intensifying from 2017 onward, the question arises: Is China’s foreign policy priority in Afghanistan primarily economic, or are other factors involved? Since 2017, China has actively engaged with Afghanistan, particularly with the “Neo-Taliban,” indicating significant changes in China’s foreign policy. By examining the changing relationship between China and Afghanistan over the past decades, it appears that China’s interests now go beyond economic benefits. After the U.S. withdrawal, Afghanistan’s significance in China’s security system has reached its highest level. Given the above, this study aims to examine the security factors shaping China's policy toward the Taliban government, posing the question: What is the most significant factor influencing China's engagement with the Taliban after August 2021? The hypothesis is that China’s dominant interest in Afghanistan is ensuring security and stability, and currently, China views economic engagement as a tool to achieve security objectives.
 Methodology
The present research is qualitative and employs the process-tracing method. In this approach, researchers analyze an event and reveal complex historical narratives by breaking it down into stages, events, and incidents, and then connect them in a causal sequence. The research begins with a stated hypothesis. Next, the chronological sequence and ordering of events are established to determine how far back in time one must look to find the cause. In a causal process, it is explained how the variables influence each other, including how the actor’s choices and decisions affected the outcome. Finally, the necessary evidence is gathered to test the hypothesis and draw a conclusion. This study uses process tracing to test the hypothesis and examines official relations between China and Afghanistan across the following periods: the Cold War era, the U.S. occupation of Afghanistan (2001–2021), and the second Taliban rule.
Result and discussion
The study shows how China’s foreign policy toward Afghanistan has shifted and transformed to achieve its security interests. Using defensive realism theory, the research concludes that from the Cold War era to the present, China has consistently maintained security concerns regarding Afghanistan. With the U.S. withdrawal in 2021, China’s responsibility to maintain stability and security in Afghanistan has grown significantly. While during the U.S. occupation China focused on Afghanistan's natural resources to sustain its economic growth, China’s motivation for broader engagement with the Taliban now stems from the Taliban's ability to contain terrorist groups threatening China’s national security. China seeks to prevent the spread of fundamentalism, extremism, and Islamic terrorism and demands that the Taliban control Uyghur militants in Afghanistan or hand them over to China. China remains deeply concerned about the radicalization of the Uyghur Muslim population in Xinjiang province. Although security remains China's primary concern, according to defensive realism, China will never resort to military intervention in Afghanistan. Instead, it aims to achieve its security goals through peaceful means, positive engagements, and various forms of exchanges and diplomacy. So far, China's most significant interaction with Afghanistan has been border-control efforts designed to prevent terrorist infiltration into China. A similar pattern has emerged in Central Asia, where China seeks to deepen cooperation with regional countries to combat terrorist threats and other security concerns. Internationally, Beijing aims to ensure that neighboring countries do not provide ideological, political, or material support to the Uyghur militant community.
Conclusion
In conclusion, China’s most important priority in Afghanistan is security, and China views engagement with the Taliban as the best way to mitigate security threats. Since the Cold War, China has always had security considerations in Afghanistan, and with the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, China’s responsibility for maintaining stability and security in Afghanistan has increased. At the current juncture, China has used the economy as a tool to achieve security interests.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Taliban Government
  • China's Foreign Policy toward Afghanistan
  • Uyghur Separatists
  • Xinjiang Province
  • Process Tracing
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