مفهوم داوری سیاسی و نسبت آن با تعددگرایی در اندیشۀ هانا آرنت و مارتا نوسبام

نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی

نویسندگان

1 دانشیار گروه علوم سیاسی دانشگاه تربیت مدرس

2 دانش آموخته دکتری علوم سیاسی گرایش اندیشه سیاسی دانشگاه تربیت مدرس

چکیده

در فلسفۀ سیاسی غرب، مفهوم «داوری» همواره به‌عنوان یک «حق» درنظر گرفته شده که با وضعیت مدنی درهم‌تنیده است. به تعبیر کانت، اساساً وضعیت مدنی به معنای حق مشاجره و رقابتِ «داوری مردم» و «حاکمان» با یکدیگر است؛ حقی که به‌واسطۀ آن و به‌صورت خودآیین، داوری مطلوب را در زندگی مدنی به‌کار ببرند. مفهوم داوری سرنوشت دیگری نیز داشته است؛ اینکه آیا «ادراک و دریافت ما از چیزها»، باید تابع الگوها و استانداردهای ثابت از قبل تعیین‌شده باشد یا هر شهروند داوری خاص خودش را می‌سازد. ازاین‌رو داوری سیاسی از جهتی اساسی و انتقادی با تعددگرایی یا تکثرگرایی پیوند می‌خورد، چراکه بسیاری از متفکران سیاسی وجود استانداردهای واحد در امر داوری را خالی از اشکال نمی‌دانند. هانا آرنت و مارتا نوسبام از جملۀ این فیلسوفان هستند که مواجهه‌ای فلسفی و سیاسی را با مفهوم داوری آغاز کرده‌اند. این دو متفکر تحت تأثیر مفهوم «فرونسیسِ» ارسطویی و کارکرد آن در شرایط و موقعیت‌های خاص و تغییرپذیر، می‌کوشند برداشتی تعددگرا از داوری سیاسی ارائه دهند که در پی استوارسازی زندگی خوب و سعادتمندانه بر مبنای قرائتی سیاسی/هنجاری است. در این مقاله ابتدا نسبت داوری و تعددگرایی سنجیده شده و پس از آن آن وجوه اشتراک و افتراق این دو فیلسوف در این زمینه ارزیابی می‌شود.
 

کلیدواژه‌ها


عنوان مقاله [English]

The Concept of Political Judgment and Its Relation to Pluralism in the Thought of Hannah Arendt and Martha Nussbaum

نویسندگان [English]

  • Seyed Ali Reza Hosseini Beheshti 1
  • Mahmoud Alipour 2
1 Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, Tarbiat Modares University
2 PhD in Political Science, Tarbiat Modares University
چکیده [English]

In Western political philosophy, the concept of judgment is considered as a right, which is related to civil status. In Kant's view, civil status basically means argument and competition between "people’s judgement" and "rulers" with each other. Citizens apply some kind of desirable judgment in civil life by using this right and autonomously. At the same time, the concept of judgment had another fate: it sought to find an answer to the question of whether "our perceptions of things" should be subject to fixed patterns and pre-established standards, or should each citizen make his or her own judgment? Hannah Arendt and Martha Nussbaum are among the philosophers who have begun a philosophical and political confrontation with the concept of judgment. Influenced by the Aristotelian concept of phronesis and its function in specific and changing circumstances, these two thinkers try to offer a pluralistic conception of political judgment, which seeks to establish a good and Eudaemonist life based on a political-normative reading. Using a comparative method, the authors have tried to evaluate the relationship between judgment and pluralism in the thought of these two philosophers. In addition, they express the commonalities and differences between these two philosophers in the field of political judgment.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Political Judgment
  • Pluralism
  • Hannah Arendt
  • Martha Nussbaum
  • Normative Political Philosophy
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