نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی
نویسندگان
1 استاد، گروه علوم سیاسی، دانشکده حقوق و علوم سیاسی، دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران.
2 دانشجوی دکتری علوم سیاسی، دانشکده حقوق و علوم سیاسی، دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران.
چکیده
کلیدواژه‌ها
موضوعات
عنوان مقاله [English]
نویسندگان [English]
Following the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan by the U.S. and its international allies, intense efforts aimed at peacemaking and conflict resolution were made at all levels to put an end to the instability and violence in this war-ravaged country. Accordingly, an attempt was made to create a new consolidated government with a focus on institutionalization in Afghanistan. An international conference was held in Bonn, Germany in 2001, in order to facilitate the consultation between Afghan political leaders and other stakeholders to discuss the establishment of the foundations of the new government in Afghanistan. The consequences of this conference included the establishment of a score of significant national organizations which constituted the foundations of the new government in Afghanistan, and the creation of a dominant coalition of diverse Aghan groups which became the ruling class. The new government received foreign aid from the U.S., its Western allies, regional states, international aid agencies, and other donors. However, the newly-established government did not last more than two decades.
One of the main objectives of this research is to investigate the institutional factors influencing the formation of the government and its performance in Afghanistan in the period of 2001-2014. The research questions are as follows: 1. What institutional factors have influenced the formation of the government in Afghanistan and its performance in 2001-2014 time period? 2. How have these institutional factors affected the formation and performance of the government in Kabul in 2001-2014 when Afghanistan benefited from "relative political stability"? In the research hypothesis, it is argued that the institutional factors led to the formation of a dominant coalition by the stakeholders among the institutions on the basis of the 2001 Bonn Agreement, and in turn the dominant coalition government was able to achieve relative political stability through rentierism and “limited access orders” to rent for the individuals and institutions outside the coalition. The method of institutional analysis—which was presented in the works of Douglas North and his associates—are used to collect and analyze data from various reports and statistical sources provided by reliable national and international centers. In addition, the authors gained insights by a careful investigation of the selected findings of the work of other scholars concerning the issue in question.
The theoretical framework was based on North’s institutionalist theory and his concept of limited access orders. The theory is useful in describing and explaining the political and economic state of affairs in the post-conflict societies. In most developing countries, individuals and institutions actively use or threaten to use violence for the purpose of having access to resources and accumulate wealth, but development programs would not be successful unless violence is curbed. Reliable stability is the most important precondition for development in all dimensions, particularly in the process of state building. To achieve stability, it is necessary to end violence and eliminate the concealed threat of the use of violence. North’s concept of the limited access orders refers to a type of institutional arrangement in which conflict-prone and conflict-ridden countries are able to curb violence by providing economic incentives to powerful groups to cooperate with each other in maintaining peace and stability. The authors compared the government performance of two previous Afghan leaders: 1) Hamid Karzai’s government during 2001-2014 which coincided with the emergence of the new government and the period of relative stability in Afghanistan; and 2) Mohammad Ashraf Ghani’s government during 2014-2021, which ended in the withdrawal of U.S, forces from the country, and Taliban’ return to power. The formation of a dominant coalition based on the logic of rent distribution, and on a kind of profitable interaction of rival individuals and institutions led to a period of stability. In other words, the behavior of the political elites in the government (dominant coalition) of Afghanistan was guided and limited by rent and this situation led to a period of relative political stability. The findings could help to gain a better and more accurate understanding of the reasons for the 2021 collapse of the regime against a background of unravelling western support in Afghanistan, and the return of Taliban to the seat of power in Kabul.
کلیدواژه‌ها [English]
References
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